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OKLAHOMA
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME 55 SPRING, 2002 NUMBER 1
THE UNCOMMON LAW: INSANITY, EXECUTIONS,
AND OKLAHOMA CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
BRYAN LESTER DUPLER*
Furiosus Furore Solum Punitur
The Madman is Punished By Madness Alone.
Latin Maxim
L Introduction
In Ford v. Wainwright,' the United States Supreme Court held that carrying out
a death sentence upon a convicted prisoner who had gone insane while awaiting
execution violates the Eighth Amendment prohibition against "cruel and unusual
punishments."' This conclusion was anything but news; most states had outlawed
the execution of the insane in the two previous centuries, and no state openly
claimed the right to execute capital prisoners who had gone insane. Having
reached such a pat constitutional conclusion, the Court splintered on more
troublesome questions. The Court failed to agree on a definition of "insanity" for
Eighth Amendment purposes and largely left to the several states the issue of what
procedures are necessary to adequately protect insane prisoners from such illegal
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I. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII. The Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishments is applicable to the states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972). For the sake of brevity, I will frequently discuss the relevant
Eighth Amendment principles without a corresponding reference to the Fourteenth Amendment.
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executions.' Ford certainly stands as an injunction to the states commanding what
they cannot do, but it says precious little about how not to do it.
This article examines several issues that the Ford Court did not, from the
standpoint of current Oklahoma law: What is the procedure that the State must
follow in cases involving a condemned inmate who has allegedly gone insane
awaiting execution? What is the legal definition of insanity in relation to a
prisoner awaiting execution, i.e., what is the legal definition of "insanity to be
executed"' Who has the burden to initially prove a condemned prisoner's
insanity? Who has the burden of proof upon an allegation that sanity has been
restored? What quantum of proof can be legally required? After a finding of
insanity, can the State forcibly medicate an insane inmate to restore his sanity for
execution? The answers to these questions require an analytical odyssey through
the ancient common law of England; the obscure statutes and decisions of the State
of Oklahoma; and several decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court, some contem-
porary and some long forgotten.
Questions surrounding the legal conception of insanity to be executed have
received less than adequate attention in Oklahoma jurisprudence and scholarship.
The dearth of legal analysis is understandable given the rarity of such cases
reaching the courts. Since statehood, a formal judicial inquiry into the sanity of
a condemned prisoner has been initiated only on three occasions: once in 1945,'
again in 1946,6 and most recently in 1994.'
This uncommon area of law came to my attention when, in March 2001, the
Oklahoma Supreme Court directed the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System to
provide counsel for Sammy Van Woudenberg in district court proceedings to
determine whether he had been restored to sanity! Sammy Van Woudenberg had
been convicted of capital murder in Muskogee County for his participation in a
1983 jailhouse murder. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals later affirmed
the conviction and sentence, and the federal courts subsequently denied habeas
corpus relief.' His social history included early diagnoses of mental retardation,
3. Ford, 477 U.S. at 416.
4. "Insanity to be executed" and "sanity to be executed" are phrases used throughout the article to
refer to the determination of whether a convicted person awaiting execution is insane so that execution
of that person would violate the Eighth Amendment.
5. Mitts v. State, 1946 OK CR 82, 170 P.2d 563, death sentence vacated by 1959 OK CR 94, 345
P.2d 913.
6. Bingham v. State, 1946 OK CR 82, 169 P.2d 311.
7. In re Van Woudenberg, No. C-94-585 (Okla. Dist. Ct. July 10, 2001).
8. In Van Woudenberg v. Taylor, No. 95,807 (Okla. Mar. 15, 2001), the Oklahoma Supreme Court
held that the Indigent Defense System is charged by statute with providing representation to capital
prisoners in proceedings to determine sanity to be executed.
9. The conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal in Van Woudenberg v. State, 1986
OK CR 81, 720 P.2d 328. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals later denied three applications for
post-conviction relief. Van Woudenberg v. State, 1997 OK CR 38, 942 P.2d 224; Van Woudenberg v.
State, 1991 OK CR 104, 818 P.2d 913; Van Woudenberg v. State, No. PC-87-633 (Okla. Crim. App.
Sept. 24, 1987). The federal district court's denial of habeas corpus was affirmed in Van Woudenberg
ex rel. Foor v. Gibson, 211 F.3d 560 (10th Cir. 2000), cert. denied, 531 U.S. 1161 (2001), abrogated
[Vol. 55:1
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol55/iss1/2
INSANITY, EXECUTIONS & CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
inhalant abuse, sexual abuse, and a form of psychosis later determined to be
schizophrenia of an undifferentiated type."0 After several years on Oklahoma's
death row, in 1994, Van Woudenberg was declared insane and therefore ineligible
to be executed." He spent most of the next six years in the Special Care Unit
(SCU) of the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, where he received psychiatric treatment
and antipsychotic medications. Sammy Van Woudenberg's mental illness was
longstanding and chronic. Neither his time on death row nor the psychiatric
treatment he received in prison did much to improve it.
In the fall of 2000, the superintendent of the Special Care Unit apparently
informed the warden that Van Woudenberg had completed the course of his
treatment and should be returned to death row.' The warden and the SCU
superintendent jointly wrote a letter to Governor Frank Keating alleging that Van
Woudenberg had regained his reason and asking the Governor to set a date for
execution.'3 Because the law was unclear regarding who had the legal authority
to set an execution date, the Oklahoma Attorney General also filed a request for
an execution date with the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals." Van Wouden-
berg's court-appointed federal habeas counsel then petitioned the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals for a stay of execution and sought to contest the allegation
of restored sanity in the Pittsburg County District Court. 5 After the Oklahoma
Supreme Court resolved a legal uncertainty concerning which state agency bore the
responsibility to provide legal representation, the Capital Post-Conviction Division
of the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System was eventually assigned to the case.'
The Honorable Steven Taylor conducted proceedings in the Pittsburg County
District Court to try the question of present sanity." Most of the research in this
by McGregor v. Gibson, 248 F.3d 946 (10th Cir. 2001) (holding that the correct standard in a procedural
competency claim is whether a petitioner can "establish that a reasonable judge should have a bona fide
doubt as to his competence at the time of trial," not whether the trial judge "ignored facts" which should
have raised a bona fide doubt, as stated in Foor). The United States Supreme Court again denied
certiorari on January 21, 2000. Van Woudenberg v. Gibson, 531 U.S. 1161 (2001).
10. Foor, 211 F.3d at 566.
11. Id. at 568.
12. In re Van Woudenberg, No. C-94-585 (Okla. Dist. Ct. July 10, 2001) (findings of fact and
conclusions of law).
13. Id.; see also Letter from Gary Gibson, Warden, and Kathy Eckenrode, CHSA, Okla. State
Penitentiary, to Hon. Frank Keating, Governor of Oklahoma (Sept. 8, 2000) (on file in Van Woudenberg
v. State, No. D-84-95 (Okla. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2001)).
14. In general, execution dates in capital cases are set by order of the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1001.1 (Supp. 1995). In the case of a prisoner who has been adjudicated
insane, the Oklahoma Statutes provide that "[w]hen the defendant recovers his reason the superintendent
of [the mental health care facility] must certify that fact to the Governor, who must thereupon issue to
the warden his warrant, appointing a day for the execution of the judgment." 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1008
(1991).
15. See Emergency Application to Hold Setting of Date for Execution in Abeyance, Van
Woudenberg v. State, No. D-84-95 (Okla. Crim. App. Feb. 21, 2001).
16. Van Woudenberg v. Taylor, No. 95,807 (Okla. Mar. 15, 2001).
17. In re Van Woudenberg, No. C-94-585 (Okla. Dist. Ct. July 10, 2001) (findings of fact and
conclusions of law).
2002]
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article was initially presented to the Pittsburg County District Court and the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals on Mr. Van Woudenberg's behalf. This most
recent phase of the case eventually ended in July 2001, without a contested trial,
when the parties stipulated that Van Woudenberg remains in a state of insanity."
However, in the proceedings leading up to the sanity trial, Oklahoma courts
addressed some key issues that will have continuing significance in future cases.
In this article, I submit the relevant legal analysis and a discussion of the state
court proceedings to posterity in the hopes that judges and advocates in future
cases might benefit from our search for answers to the important questions we
encountered in this uncommon law.
II. Ford v. Wainwright: Ground Rules in Search of Ground?
Any discussion of constitutional criminal procedure and sanity (or in more
modern parlance, competency) to be executed must begin with the Supreme Court's
1986 opinion in Ford v. Wainwright." Alvin Ford was convicted of murder and
sentenced to death in Florida. Although there was no suggestion of mental
incompetency at trial or sentencing, Ford subsequently showed signs of mental
illness. He became obsessed with the activities of the Ku Klux Klan, writing
letters to various people about his "Klan work" and claiming that he was the victim
of a vast conspiracy designed to force him to commit suicide.'
Ford also expressed delusions that the prison guards were killing people and
hiding their bodies in the concrete bunks of his prison cell, that his female
relatives were being sexually tortured in other parts of the prison, and that other
members of his family were being held hostage. Ford's delusions developed to
include a full-blown hostage crisis in which the perpetrators had taken hold of
"'senators, Senator Kennedy, and many other leaders.' 2' Ford wrote a letter to the
Florida Attorney General claiming that he had ended the crisis and fired several
prison officials. He eventually referred to himself as "Pope John Paul Ill" and
claimed to have appointed nine new justices to the Florida Supreme Court.' His
condition finally deteriorated to a point where his sole communication with his
attorneys consisted of an incoherent code in which he repeatedly used the word
"one." Ford told his attorneys: "Hands one, face one. Mafia one. God one, father
one, Pope one. Pope One. Leader One."'
After two psychiatrists examined Ford at defense counsel's request, both told
defense counsel that Ford was mentally incompetent. Ford's counsel then invoked
the Florida statutory procedure for a determination of competency to be executed.
The Governor appointed three psychiatrists to examine Ford. These examiners
jointly interviewed Ford for a total of thirty minutes in the presence of no less than
18. Id. at 4.
19. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
20. Id. at 402.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 403.
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eight other people, including Ford's counsel, the State's attorneys, and Florida
correctional officials.
The psychiatrists filed separate reports with the Governor, to whom the ultimate
decision on competency was delegated under Florida law. They variously
described Ford as having "psychosis with paranoia," being "psychotic," and having
a "severe adaptational disorder."'24 However, all three of the examiners believed
that Ford was competent to be executed. The Governor refused defense counsel's
attempt to provide additional documentation supporting Ford's incompetency.
Subsequently, without explanation of his findings, the Governor signed Ford's
death warrant.'
Ford's attorneys unsuccessfully sought a de novo hearing on Ford's competency
in Florida state courts.' A habeas petition filed on Ford's behalf in federal district
court requested an evidentiary hearing to determine the question of Ford's present
sanity, but the district court denied the petition without a hearing." The court of
appeals addressed the claim of incompetency on the merits and subsequently
affirmed the district court's denial of the writ.' The United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari to determine "whether the Eighth Amendment prohibits the
execution of the insane and, if so, whether the District Court should have held a
hearing on petitioner's claim.""
Relying heavily on English common law precedents, five Justices of the
Supreme Court held that the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against "cruel and
unusual punishments" applied to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment's
Due Process Clause and banned the states' use of capital punishment against
prisoners who have gone insane.' Reasoning that no state allowed execution of
the insane and that the "humane limitation upon the State's ability to execute its
sentences has as firm a hold ... as it had centuries ago in England," the Court
found no value in executing a person who cannot understand his punishment."
Ultimately, the Court held:
Faced with such widespread evidence of a restriction upon sovereign
power, this Court is compelled to conclude that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits a State from carrying out a sentence of death upon a prisoner
who is insane. Whether its aim be to protect the condemned from fear
and pain without comfort of understanding, or to protect the dignity of
society itself from the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance, the
restriction finds enforcement in the Eighth Amendment.32
24. Id. at 404.
25. Id.
26. Ford v. Wainwright, 451 So. 2d 471 (Fla. 1984).
27. Ford, 477 U.S. at 404.
28. id. at 404-05.
29. id. at 405.
30. Id. at 409-10.
31. Id. at 409.
32. Id. at 409-10.
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After recognizing the existence of a substantive Eighth Amendment protection
against being executed while insane, a plurality of the Court went on to hold that
a state must provide some form of adversarial, judicial forum in which the
question of insanity can be determined.33 Necessarily, the plurality condemned
Florida's wholly executive, ex parte sanity procedure as inadequate to protect a
fundamental constitutional right, explaining that "any procedure that precludes the
prisoner ... from presenting material relevant to his sanity or bars consideration
of that material by the factfinder is necessarily inadequate."' ' To the Court, the
most striking procedural defect in Florida's statutory scheme was the statute's
"placement of the [execution] decision wholly within the executive branch."35
Because the Governor's subordinates oversaw the entire prosecution from arrest to
sentencing, the Court reasoned that the Governor lacked the neutrality "necessary
for reliability in the factfinding proceeding."'
The Supreme Court concluded "that the State's procedures for determining sanity
[were] inadequate to preclude federal redetermination of the constitutional
issue,"" reversed the judgment of the court of appeals, and remanded the case to
the district court for an evidentiary hearing on Ford's claim of insanity.
Justice Powell, in his opinion concurring in part and concurring in the judgment,
agreed that the execution of insane prisoners violates the Eighth Amendment
proscription against "cruel and unusual punishments."' His opinion also offered
a legal definition of insanity to be executed, something entirely omitted by the
other Justices." This definition is discussed in Part VII of this article. Finally,
Justice Powell's opinion disagreed with the plurality's position that an adversarial
judicial hearing on the question of sanity was the only way to adequately protect
the Eighth Amendment right not to be executed while insane.' Justice Powell
stated that he would require much less than a formal trial. He would only require
that an impartial board hear the prisoner's evidence and would grant the states
"substantial leeway to determine what process best balances the various interests
at stake.""
33. Id. at 418.
34. Id. at 414. Explaining the procedure afforded the prisoner in this case, the Court stated:
Petitioner received the statutory process. The Governor selected three psychiatrists, who
together interviewed Ford for a total of 30 minutes, in the presence of eight other people,
including Ford's counsel, the State's attorneys, and correctional officials. The Governor's
order specifically directed that the attorneys should not participate in the examination in
any adversarial manner. This order was consistent with the present Governor's "publicly
announced policy of excluding all advocacy on the part of the condemned from the
process of determining whether a person under a sentence of death is insane."
Id. at 412-13 (quoting Goode v. Wainwright, 448 So. 2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1984)).
35. Id. at 416.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 418 (Powell, J., concurring).
39. Id, at 422 (Powell, J., concurring).
40. Id. at 426 (Powell, J., concurring).
41. Id. at 427 (Powell, J., concurring). Justice Powell went on state, "As long as basic fairness is
[Vol. 55:1
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Justices O'Connor and White also concurred in the Court's judgment to remand
the case for further proceedings but used a very different rationale. Justice
O'Connor's opinion, joined by Justice White, dissented from the Court's conclusion
that a substantive prohibition against executing the insane can be found in the
Eighth Amendment."' However, because Justice O'Connor found that the Florida
statutes created a protected "liberty interest," she agreed with the plurality that
allegedly insane prisoners are entitled to procedural due process before a state can
execute a prisoner who has raised the issue of sanity."3
Because ... the conclusion is for me inescapable that Florida positive
law has created a protected liberty interest in avoiding execution while
incompetent, and because Florida does not provide even those minimal
procedural protections required by due process in this area, I would
vacate the judgment and remand to the Court of Appeals with
directions that the case be returned to the Florida system so that a
hearing can be held in a manner consistent with the requirements of
the Due Process Clause. I cannot agree, however, that the federal
courts should have any role whatever in the substantive determination
of a defendant's competency to be executed."
Dissenting, Justice Rehnquist and Chief Justice Burger denied that the Eighth
Amendment included a substantive prohibition against executing the insane.
They disputed the majority's historico-legal analysis of the common law
prohibition, characterizing the prisoner's sanity to undergo execution as a question
generally committed to the discretion of the executive branch rather than a matter
of law.' The dissenters saw no difference between the question presented by
Ford and the claim previously rejected in the 1950 case of Solesbee v. Balkcom. 7
The dissenters quoted from Solesbee:
"Postponement of execution because of insanity bears a close affinity
not to trial for a crime but rather to reprieves of sentences in general.
The power to reprieve has usually sprung from the same source as the
observed, I would find due process satisfied, and would apply the presumption of correctness .. .on
federal habeas corpus." Id.
42. Id. (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 427-28 (O'Connor, J.. concurring in part and dissenting in part). Justice O'Connor went
on to state:
In my view, however, the only federal question presented in cases such as this is
whether the State's positive law has created a liberty interest and whether its procedures
are adequate to protect that interest from arbitrary deprivation. Once satisfied that the
procedures were adequate, a federal court has no authority to second-guess a State's
substantive competency determination.
Id. at 430-31 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in pan).
45. Id. at 431 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 432 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (citing Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9 (1950)).
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power to pardon. Power of executive clemency in this country
undoubtedly derived from the practice as it had existed in England.
Such power has traditionally rested in governors or the President,
although some of that power is often delegated to agencies such as
pardon or parole boards. Seldom, if ever, has this power of executive
clemency been subjected to review by the courts."
Since no State sanctions execution of the insane, the real battle
being fought in this case is over what procedures must accompany the
inquiry into sanity. The Court reaches the result it does by examining
the common law, creating a constitutional right that no State seeks to
violate, and then concluding that the common-law procedures are
inadequate to protect the newly created but common-law based right.
I find it unnecessary to "constitutionalize" the already uniform view
that the insane should not be executed, and inappropriate to "sele-
ctively incorporate" the common law practice. I therefore dissent."
Ford established two important constitutional principles: (1) execution of an
insane prisoner is "cruel and unusual" punishment that directly violates the
language of the Eighth Amendment; and (2) nonadversarial, state administrative
procedures for determining the prisoner's sanity are inadequate to protect such a
fundamental constitutional right."9 If the dissenters in Ford were correct, the
Court's announcement of a ban on executions, which no State had sought to carry
out, was a needless exercise in constitutional lawmaking. But the correctness of
their view is doubtful for several reasons. The dissenters' characterization of
sanity-determination procedures as traditionally executive fails to adequately
explain the existence of common law decisions and commentaries that unswer-
vingly regarded a plea of insanity to be executed as a judicial matter that, in cases
of doubt, must be tried by a jury. Another section of this article will discuss
another weakness of the Ford dissent - its reliance on Solesbee v. Balkcom. A
careful examination of Supreme Court decisions in this area shows that Solesbee
itself was an extreme aberration from the course of established law and was based
on a serious misreading of the common law decisions; consequently, the dissenting
Justices' faith in Solesbee as correct authority was misplaced.
In sum, Ford v. Wainwright authorized federal habeas corpus review of
substantive claims of insanity as a matter of personal right under the Eighth
Amendment. Ford also put the states on notice that the failure to adopt adequate
procedures to protect this substantive constitutional right would result in
relitigation of the factual question of insanity de novo in a federal evidentiary
hearing." Rather than a needless injunction prohibiting a discarded practice, Ford
is an important decision because it uniformly extends substantive and procedural
48. Id. at 432, 435 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting Solesbee, 339 U.S. at 11-12).
49. Id. at 410.
50. Id. at 418.
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protections to all capital prisoners who are, or may be, insane. If the dissenters'
view had prevailed, federal court review of individual claims of insanity would be
nonexistent. And according to the procedural due process view endorsed by
concurring Justices O'Connor and White, federal court review of state sanity
determinations would be limited to a very narrow requirement that the states
observe fundamental fairness under the Fourteenth Amendment. A state's governor,
although an elected, partisan official and technically its chief prosecutor, could
make the sanity determination, so long as he agreed beforehand to consider the
written submissions of the condemned prisoner. It is not overly pessimistic to
think this type of process might uphold the "prohibition" against executing the
insane by virtually ensuring that no prisoner could ever meet the decision maker's
test for insanity.
Moreover, Justice O'Connor's opinion makes it abundantly clear that the
availability of a procedural due process review in federal court would initially turn
on whether the individual state had created a "liberty interest" in avoiding
execution while insane.' States seeking to avoid federal court intervention in their
capital punishment schemes would be free to repeal longstanding statutory or
constitutional prohibitions against such executions for the purpose of negating the
preexisting "liberty interest" and thus prospectively limiting a prisoner's federal
rights to a procedural due process review.
Compared to the judicial review mechanism sanctioned in Ford - which
consisted of recognizing a substantive right and giving the states procedural
incentives to adequately protect it - the course offered by Justice O'Connor might
very well have rewarded the states' traditional reluctance to execute the insane with
a perverse incentive to abandon it. It may seem doubtful that a great many states
would consider such a break with historical legal and moral principles. But some
death penalty states, grown weary of federal court involvement in capital cases,
might predictably opt to curtail the availability of federal habeas review wherever
they could. The end result would be a death penalty patchwork quilt in which
some capital prisoners received judicial review of their substantive claims of
insanity (in state court), others received a procedural due process review only (in
federal court), and some received no judicial review at all. In this light, Fords
holding is justified by the need to uniformly guard against the episodic infliction
of a punishment that has been so universally condemned.
5 1. id. at 430 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
52. The Oklahoma statutory procedure concerning alleged restoration of sanity, title 22, section 1008
of the Oklahoma Statutes, which is discussed in the following section, allows a wholly executive and
nonadversarial procedure even more truncated than the procedure condemned in Ford. Without an
opportunity for the prisoner to contest the certification of sanity or submit contrary evidence, such a
procedure would clearly violate Ford. But as this article demonstrates, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals does not follow the literal language of the statute when, after the initial finding of insanity, the
question of a prisoner's restoration of sanity arises.
20021
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Il. The Framework for "A Hazardous Guess": Oklahoma's Sanity-
Determination Statutes and Their Origin in the Common Law
"In the history of murder, the onset of insanity while awaiting execution of a
death sentence is not a rare phenomenon." 3 Moreover,
[t]hat it offends our historic heritage to kill a man who has become
insane while awaiting sentence cannot be gainsaid. This limitation on
the power of the State to take life has been part of our law for
centuries, recognized during periods of English history when feelings
were more barbarous and men recoiled less from brutal action than we
like to think is true of our time.'
In 1911, the Oklahoma Legislature enacted a statutory framework for dealing
with cases of capital prisoners who had gone insane while awaiting execution. The
statutes governing sanity to be executed have not been amended since 1913.
Enacted as sections 1005-1008 of title 22 of the Oklahoma Statutes, the law
provides as follows:
§ 1005. Prisoner becoming insane-Question for jury trial
If, after his delivery to the warden for execution, there is good
reason to believe that a defendant under judgment of death has become
insane, the warden must call such fact to the attention of the district
attorney of the county in which the prison is situated, whose duty is to
immediately file in the district or superior court of such county a
petition stating the conviction and judgment and the fact that the
defendant is believed to be insane and asking that the question of his
sanity be inquired into. Thereupon, the court must at once cause to be
summoned and impaneled from the regular jury list a jury of twelve
persons to hear such inquiry.
§ 1006. Attendance by district attorney-Witnesses for inquisition
The district attorney must attend the inquisition, and may produce
witnesses before the jury, for which purpose he may issue process in
the same manner as for witnesses to attend before the grand jury, and
disobedience thereto may be punished in like manner as disobedience
to process issued by the court.
53. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 333 U.S. 9, 14 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); see also Harvey Bluestone &
Carl L. McGahee, Reaction to Extreme Stress: Impending Death by Execution, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY
393 (1962); Ptolemy H. Taylor, Comment, Execution of the "Artificially Competent": Cruel and
Unusual? 66 TUL. L. REv. 1045, 1049 (1992) ("One of the least common and possibly the most stressful
of all human experiences is the anticipation of death at a specific moment and in a known manner.")
(quoting Johnnie L. Gallemore & James H. Panton, Inmate Responses to Lengthy Death Row
Confinement, 129 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 167, 167 (1972)).
54. Solesbee, 333 U.S. at 16.
[Vol. 55:1
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol55/iss1/2
INSANITY, EXECUTIONS & CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
§ 1007. Verdict-Order of the court
The verdict of the jury must be entered upon the minutes and
thereupon the court must make and cause to be entered an order
reciting the fact of such inquiry and the result thereof, and when it is
found that the defendant is insane the order must direct that he be
taken to one of the state hospitals for the insane and there kept for safe
confinement until his reason is restored.
1008. Execution of judgment-Proceedings when defendant found
insane-Recovery of reason
If it is found that the defendant is sane the warden must proceed to
execute the judgment as certified in the warrant; if it is found that the
defendant is insane, the warden must suspend the execution and
transmit a certified copy of the order mentioned in the last section to
the Governor and deliver the defendant, together with a certified copy
of such order to the medical superintendent of the hospital named in
such order. When the defendant recovers his reason the superintendent
of such hospital must certify that fact to the Governor, who must
thereupon issue to the warden his warrant, appointing a day for the
execution of the judgment.5
Oklahoma's statutory procedure for determining a capital prisoner's sanity to be
executed undoubtedly arises from that solemn rule of the English common law,
which is often quoted from the writings of the great jurist William Blackstone:
[I]f a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense, and before
arraignment for it he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for
it; because he is not able to plead to it with that advice and caution
that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner becomes mad,
he shall not be tried: for how can he make his defense? If, after he be
tried and found guilty, he loses his senses before judgment, judgment
shall not be pronounced; and if, after judgment, he becomes of nonsane
memory, execution shall be stayed: for peradventure, says the
humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of sound memory,
he might have alleged something in stay of judgment or execution. '
Centuries before Blackstone penned those memorable lines, English judges had
recognized that execution of a prisoner who had gone mad was against common
decency and common law. The doctrine was a matter of rote and respectful
recitation by the middle of the eighteenth century, when England produced some
of its most eloquent chroniclers and commentators on the rules and decisions of
the common law."
55. 22 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1005-1008 (1991) (legislative history and footnote omitted).
56. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *24-*25.
57. Writing in 1736, Sir Matthew Hale stated this unquestioned principle of the common law:
If a man in his sound memory commits a capital offense, and before his arraignment he
becomes absolutely mad, he ought not by law to be arraigned during such his phrenzy,
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While these authorities seemed to focus on the prisoner's sanity solely as a
function of his ability to plead some matter against the judgment, the early writers
also found justification for the rule in basic humanitarian principles. Even the
King's lawyers, in those monarchical times, stated this rule with eloquence. Sir
John Hawles, Solicitor-General to the Courts of King William III, stated that "it
is inconsistent with humanity to make Examples of them; it is inconsistent with
Religion, as being against Christian charity, to send a great Offender quick, as it
is stiled, into another World, when he is not of a capacity to fit himself for it."58
When discussing King Henry VIII's tyrannical attempts to abrogate the rule
against such executions in cases of high treason, Lord Coke perceived that the
common law rule was supported by its morality as well as its practical jus-
tifications: "[Blut so it is not when a mad man is executed, but should be a
miserable spectacle, both against law, and of extreme inhumanity and cruelty, and
can be no example to others."59 Blackstone himself also offered an essentially
humanitarian justification for the common law prohibition in the penetrating
maxim: furiosus furore solum punitur ("a madman is punished by his madness
alone").'
Collectively, these writings on the ancient principles of the common law of
England are the legal precursors to the insanity defense, incompetency to stand
but be remitted to prison until that incapacity be removed; the reason is, because he
cannot advisedly plead to the indictment .... And if such person after his plea, and
before his trial, become of non sane memory, he shall not be tried; or, if after his trial he
become of non sane memory, he shall not receive judgment; or, if after judgment he
become of non sane memory, his execution shall be spared; for were he of sound memory,
he might allege somewhat in stay of judgment or execution.
MATTHEW HALE, THE HISTORY OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 34-35 (photo. reprint 1989) (1736).
William Hawkins, in an earlier treatise also entitled Pleas of the Crown, gave this statement of the rule
and its reasons: "And it seems agreed at this Day, That if one who has committed a capital Offence,
become Non Compos before Conviction, he shall not be arraigned; and if after Conviction, that he shall
not be executed .... " WILLIAM HAWKINS, A TREATISE OF THE PLEAS OF THE CROWN 2 (1716). John
Hawles, writing in 1689 on the trial of Charles Bateman, stated:
For nothing is more certain in Law, than that a Person who falls Mad after a Crime
supposed to be committed, shall not be tryed for it; and if he fall Mad after Judgment, he
shall not be executed, though I do not think the reason given for the Law in that point
will maintain it, which is that the end of Punishment is the striking a Terror into others,
but the Execution of a Mad-man had not that effect; which is not true, for the Terror to
the living is equal, whether the Person be Mad or in his Senses ... but the true reason
of the Law, I think to be this, a Person of non sane Memoria, and a Lunatick during his
Lunacy, is by an Act of God (for so it is called, though the means may be humane, be it
violent, as hard imprisonment, Terror of death, or natural, as sickness) disabled to make
his just defence, there may be circumstances lying in his private knowledge, which would
prove his innocency, of which he can have no advantage, because not known to the
Persons, who shall take upon them his Defence ....
JOHN HAWLES, REMARKS UPON THE TRYALS 101 (photo. reprint 1974) (1689).
58. HAWLES, supra note 57, at 102.
59. EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 6 (photo.
reprint 1985) (London, W. Clarke 1817) (1644).
60. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at *24.
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trial, and competency (or in Oklahoma's statutes, "sanity") to be executed. And all
of these concepts impel those who interpret and apply the law to make profound
judgments about their fellow human beings: Is this person mentally fit to be put
on trial? Is this person fit to be held judicially responsible for crime and even
executed as punishment?
Dissenting in Solesbee v. Balkcom,61 Justice Felix Frankfurter noted the
daunting uncertainty inherent in the judicial determination of sanity to be executed.
He noted that the execution of an insane person requires an "ascertainment of what
is called a fact, but which in the present state of the mental sciences is at best a
hazardous guess however conscientious. '
Writing for the Supreme Court thirty-six years later in Ford v. Wainwright,
Justice Marshall quoted Frankfurter and reaffirmed the difficulty of ascertaining
present sanity to be executed:
Although the condemned prisoner does not enjoy the same
presumptions accorded a defendant who has yet to be convicted or
sentenced, he has not lost the protection of the Constitution altogether;
if the Constitution renders the fact or timing of his execution contin-
gent upon establishment of a further fact, then that fact must be
determined with the high regard for truth that befits a decision
affepting the life or death of a human being. Thus, the ascertainment
of a prisoner's sanity as a predicate to lawful execution calls for no
less stringent standards than those demanded in any other aspect of a
capital proceeding. Indeed, a particularly acute need for guarding
against error inheres in a determination that "in the present state of the
mental sciences is at best a hazardous guess however conscientious."
That need is greater still because the ultimate decision will turn on the
finding of a single fact, not on a range of equitable considerations.'
Assuming that the rule prohibiting execution of the insane is, at this point, an
indisputable point of substantive constitutional law, this article turns to the issues
surrounding the first controversial matter of procedure: To whom must the
question of sanity to be executed be tried: a judge or a jury?
IV. Statutory and Constitutional Rights to Trial by Jury to Determine Sanity to
Be Executed
A. Standing to Commence a Judicial Inquiry into Present Sanity and the Right to
an "Initial" Jury Trial
According to title 22, section 1005 of the Oklahoma Statutes, the Oklahoma
Legislature vested the exclusive authority in the warden of the Oklahoma State
61. 333 U.S. 9, 14 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
62. Id. at 23 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
63. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,411-12 (1986) (citation omitted) (quoting Solesbee, 339 U.S.
at 23).
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Penitentiary to commence a judicial inquiry into a condemned prisoner's present
sanity.6' The statute provides that if, after delivery to the warden, there is "reason
to believe" that the prisoner has gone insane,
the warden must call such fact to the attention of the district attorney
of the county in which the prison is situated, whose duty is to
immediately file in the district or superior court of such county a
petition stating the conviction and judgment and the fact that the
defendant is believed to be insane and asking that the question of his
sanity be inquired into.'
The 1913 Oklahoma statute, which vests in the warden this exclusive power to
commence a judicial inquiry into the prisoner's sanity, is of doubtful
constitutionality after Ford v. Wainwright. Ford recognized Eighth and Fourteenth
Amendment rights to petition the court for a judicial determination of present
sanity; these rights are personal to the prisoner and may be invoked by the prisoner
himself or perhaps by third parties acting on his behalf.' The American Bar
Association's Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards, adopted in 1987 in
response to Ford, also endorsed this broader view of standing to commence a
judicial inquiry of the condemned prisoner's sanity." Standard 7-5.7 provides in
part:
(a) Whenever a correctional official, other state official, the
prosecution, or counsel for the convict have reason to believe that a
convict who has been sentenced to death may be currently incom-
petent, such person should petition the court for an order requiring an
evaluation of the convict's current mental condition. If the court
concludes that the information in the petition indicates reasonable
cause to believe that the convict may be incompetent, it should order
an evaluation.
(b) Any interested person who has reason to believe that the convict
may be currently incompetent may petition the court for an order
requiring an evaluation of the convicts current mental condition. If the
court concludes that the information in the petition indicates reasonable
cause to believe that the convict may be incompetent, it should order
an evaluation, and, if the convict is not represented by counsel, appoint
counsel for the convict."
64. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1005 (1991).
65. Id.
66. This interpretation would be similar to the approach taken in more recent legislative enactments
on the related subject of competency to stand trial. Title 22, section 1175.2(a) of the Oklahoma Statutes
permits the judge, prosecutor, or defense attorney to petition the court for a determination of whether the
defendant is competent to stand trial.
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Because of the modern recognition of these broader notions of standing to
request a sanity determination, a district court faced with a prisoner-initiated or
third-party petition for a sanity determination is probably duty bound to consider
whether the petition states facts giving the court a "reason to believe" that the
prisoner is presently insane. Upon the filing of a petition seeking a sanity
determination, the district court "must at once cause to be summoned and
impaneled from the regular jury list a jury of twelve persons to hear such
inquiry."' Regardless of whether the inquiry is commenced by the warden, the
prisoner, defense counsel, or interested third parties, section 1005 undoubtedly
requires that the initial judicial determination of present sanity be conducted as a
jury trial.
B. The Complicated Question: A "Restoration of Sanity" Trial?
If the initial sanity trial conducted pursuant to section 1005 results in a verdict
that the prisoner is presently insane, section 1007 requires that the prisoner be
committed to the state mental hospital until his sanity is restored.' The authority
to determine when the prisoner has regained his sanity is, in the first instance,
vested exclusively in the superintendent of the state mental hospital, or more likely
the superintendent of the Special Care Unit at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary.7
Section 1008 provides that "[w]hen the defendant recovers his reason the
superintendent of such hospital must certify that fact to the Governor, who must
thereupon issue to the warden his warrant, appointing a day for the execution of
the judgment."'2
If the procedure prescribed in section 1008 were the literal statement of the law,
this article - like the life of a prisoner certified sane by the superintendent -
would be short indeed. But the wholly executive, ex parte procedure set out in
section 1008 clearly violates Ford v. Wainwright. It denies the capital prisoner any
right to contest his present sanity in a full and fair judicial proceeding. This raises
69. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1005 (1991).
70. Id. § 1007. In the only recent Oklahoma case, the literal language of the statute was not
followed. After Sammy Van Woudenberg was found insane by the jury in 1994, he was transferred to
the Special Care Unit inside the Oklahoma State Penitentiary, where he underwent psychiatric treatment
and observation. This was done by the agreement of the parties and with the consent of the court;
therefore, the question of whether state law requires that the prisoner actually be removed from the
penitentiary to a state mental hospital has never been litigated in the appellate courts. Since the
enactment of section 1005 in 1911, the availability of psychiatric care has changed considerably. In 1989,
the Oklahoma Legislature directed the Department of Corrections to "develop and implement a special
treatment program at the Joseph Harp Correctional Center for inmates with severe psychiatric problems,
including inmates convicted of sex-related offenses and inmates that have prior convictions for sex-
related offenses." 57 OKLA. STAT. § 509.4 (1991). In 1990, the Oklahoma Legislature further authorized
the creation of the Special Care Unit at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary "for the care and treatment of
inmates, classified as maximum security, who are or become in need of acute psychiatric care." Id. §
400. The modem availability of professional psychiatric care within the prison system arguably indicates
that the earlier statute requiring transfer of insane prisoners to a state mental hospital has been repealed
by implication.
71. See 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1008 (1991).
72. Id.
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the following question: If section 1008 does not set forth a constitutionally
adequate procedure to be followed where the prisoner has allegedly regained his
sanity, what procedure must be followed?
Ford v. Wainwright demands that states afford some reliable, judicial procedure
for the determination of present sanity to be executed, but it says little about the
type of procedures necessary to protect the prisoner's right not to be executed
while insane. While the Supreme Court found the executive, ex parte inquiry used
by Florida to be inadequate, it left the states to decide how to best implement an
enforcement mechanism for the newly recognized constitutional right. In
Oklahoma, the answer to this question of proper procedure is found in three
distinct sources of law, including the Oklahoma Statutes, the Oklahoma
Constitution, and the common law of England. Collectively, these authorities
provide that, in cases of difficulty or doubt, the prisoner who has allegedly
regained his reason may demand that the question of present sanity be decided in
a trial by jury.
1. The State Constitutionalization of Common Law Trials by Jury
The framers of Oklahoma's Progressive-Era Constitution guaranteed a fundamen-
tal right to trial by jury. The language declaring this right as "inviolate" has
persisted through numerous revisions and is contained in article 2, section 19 of
the Oklahoma Constitution. 3 What is this "inviolate" right and when may its
protections be invoked? A wealth of authority holds that, in adopting this
constitutional provision, the people vouchsafed the right to jury trial in all cases
where it existed at the common law, except as specifically modified by the
constitutional text itself.
For example, in Keeter v. State,' the Oklahoma Supreme Court specifically
held that the right to jury trial is guaranteed according to the common law:
The right to trial by jury, declared inviolate by section 19, art. 2, of the
Constitution of Oklahoma, except as modified by the Constitution
itself, has reference to the right as it existed in the territories at the
time of the adoption of the Constitution, and the right to a jury trial
therein referred to was not predicated upon the statutes existing in the
73. Compare OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19 (amended 1991), with OKLA. CONST. art. II, § 19. In full,
the current provision provides:
The right of trial by jury shall be and remain inviolate, except in civil cases wherein the
amount in controversy does not exceed One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00),
or in criminal cases wherein punishment for the offense charged is by fine only, not
exceeding One Thousand Five Hundred Dollars ($1,500.00). Provided, however, that the
Legislature may provide for jury trial in cases involving lesser amounts. Juries for the trial
of civil cases, involving more than Ten Thousand Dollars ($10,000.00), and felony
criminal cases shall consist of twelve (12) persons. All other juries shall consist of six (6)
persons. However, in all cases the parties may agree on a lesser number of jurors than
provided herein.
OKLA. CONST. art. i, § 19.
74. 1921 OK 197, 198 P. 866.
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territories at that time, but the right as guaranteed under the federal
Constitution and according to the course of the common law.75
Similarly, in Pine v. State Industrial Commission,' the Oklahoma Supreme Court
interpreted article 2, section 19 as follows: "[This] provision in our Bill of Rights
is uniformly interpreted to provide for the retention of right of trial by jury only
where the right of jury trial existed at common law."" This preservation of
common law trials by jury was the usual practice of American states when they
adopted constitutional provisions. In Keeter, the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted
this fact in a reference to the authoritative work of Judge Cooley, who stated that
"[t]he [states'] constitutional provisions do not extend the right [to a jury trial];
they only secure it in the cases in which it was a matter of right before. But in
doing this, they preserve the historical jury of twelve men with all its incidents,
unless a contrary purpose clearly appears.""8  Thus, under the Oklahoma
Constitution and other state constitutions, the right to jury trial incorporates the
mandates of the common law.
2. Common Law Usage of Trial by Jury to Determine Sanity
With these principles in view, the determinative question becomes whether the
common law recognized the right to a jury trial to determine a prisoner's sanity to
be executed. Authoritative statements on this point abound. William Blackstone
clearly set forth the common law rule, stating:
[I]n the bloody reign of Henry the Eighth, a statute was made which
enacted, that if a person, being compos mentis (of sane mind), should
commit high treason, and after fall into madness, he might be tried in
his absence, and should suffer death, as if he were of perfect memory.
But this savage and inhuman law was repealed .... For, as observed
by Sir Edward Coke, "the execution of the offender is for example, ut
poena ad paucos metus ad omnes perveniat (that few may suffer, but
all may dread punishment): but so it is not when a madman is
executed; but should be a miserable spectacle, both against law, and of
extreme inhumanity and cruelty, and can be no example to others."
But if there be any doubt whether the party be compos or not, this
shall be tried by a jury.'
Following the common law, the earliest American decisions are in accord with
this fundamental principle. In the 1826 case of Bonds v. State,' a prisoner was
75. Id. I. -, 198 P. at 866.
76. 1924 OK 876, 229 P. 784, withdrawn on other grounds, 1925 OK 287, 235 P. 617.
77. Id. I _, 229 P. at 788.
78. Keeter, 1921 OK 197, 9 -_, 198 P. at 868 (quoting THOMAS M. COOLEY, CONSTITUTIONAL
LIMITATIONS 589-90 (7th ed. 1903)).
79. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at *24-*25 (quoting EDWARD COKE, THE THIRD PART OF THE
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWs OF ENGLAND 6 (1644)).
80. 8 Tenn. 142, 1 Mart. & Yer. 137 (Tenn. 1827).
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convicted of murder and sentenced to death. Through his counsel, the prisoner
pled his insanity as grounds to bar the execution. The trial judge examined the
prisoner, found that no doubt was raised as to his sanity, found that no fact was
proven to support the plea, overruled the plea, and refused to order the jury. On
appeal, the Supreme Court of Tennessee upheld the trial court's ruling. However,
the court made clear that in cases raising any doubt as to the prisoner's sanity, the
court should impanel a jury to try the issue."
Justice Whyte, delivering the opinion of the Tennessee Supreme Court, reasoned
that the jury trial was the mode of procedure prescribed at the common law and
cited the following from Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown:
[E]very person of the age of discretion is presumed of sane memory,
until the contrary appears, which may be, either by inspection of the
Court, by evidence given to the jury, who are charged to try the
indictment or, by being collateral issue, the fact may be pleaded and
replied to one term, and a venire awarded, returnable instanter in the
nature of an inquest of office; and this method, in cases of importance,
doubt, or difficulty, the Court will in prudence and discretion adopt."
The Supreme Court of Tennessee found no error in the trial court's denial of the
motion for a jury trial of the issue, reasoning that the statement of counsel, without
the pleading of facts to support the claimed insanity, did not warrant the
impaneling of a jury to try the issue."a Standing alone, counsel's plea created no
triable issue of fact and the jury was therefore properly denied.
In another early American case, Commonwealth v. Buccieri," the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania characterized the plea of insanity to be executed as "an
appeal to the humanity of the court to postpone punishment until a recovery takes
place, or as a merciful dispensation. If a case of real doubt arise, a just judge will
not fail to relieve his own conscience by submitting the fact to a jury."'5 Thus,
the court found that a jury trial was the proper forum for deciding the issue of
81. Specifically, the court held:
If a prisoner who has been tried and found guilty of murder allege by his counsel (as a
reason why sentence of death should not be pronounced upon him) that he at that time
is a lunatic, and the judge, upon his own inspection, is satisfied the plea is false, he may
pronounce the sentence of the law without having a jury empanelled to ascertain the fact.
But if the court have any doubt, or if be a case of difficulty, they ought to award a venire,
returnable instanter, to have the fact ascertained.
id. at 142, I Mart. & Yer. at 137.
82. Id. at 144, I Mart. & Yer. at 139 (citation omitted) (quoting HAWKINS, supra note 57, at 3).
83. Id. at 144-45, i Mart. & Yer. at 139.
84. 26 A. 228 (Pa. 1893).
85. Id. at 235 (quoting Laros v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. 200,211 (1877)). Buccieri was cited by the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals in Denton v. State, 1935 OK CR _, I - 53 P.2d 1136,
1140, for a proposition demonstrated later in this section: If a trial judge has a measure of "discretion"
to deny a jury trial of the question of insanity - as some cases have mentioned and modern (post-Ford)
cases invariably claim - that discretion is limited to those cases where the prisoner's plea fails to raise
a legitimate factual doubt of present insanity.
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sanity to be executed. However, the court affirmed the trial court's denial of a jury
to try the issue of the condemned prisoner's present sanity because nothing had
been pled to properly raise a doubt.'
In State v. Vann, 7 a capital prisoner was brought before the court for judgment.
By his counsel, the prisoner entered the plea of present insanity and filed affidavits
in support of the plea." The trial court held that he was entitled to a jury to try
the sanity issue and passed the case to the next term for trial.' The State brought
an appeal.'y The Supreme Court of North Carolina affirmed the trial court's
ruling, stating that "judgment must be suspended, if the prisoner has become insane
. .. until he recovers his reason, and that an issue to be submitted to the jury is
the proper mode of ascertaining the truth of his allegation."' The court further
observed that the "same rule is laid down by the elementary writers and may be
found in adjudged cases.
'
9
The Supreme Court of Colorado, in Bulger v. People,"3 followed the same rule.
In that case, the prisoner had pled insanity against his execution, and a jury had
found him sane. The court held that the prisoner could not appeal the jury's sanity
determination and noted that the trial court had followed the proper procedure by
trying the matter to a jury:
It will be observed that both the common law and the statute are
specific that, when a person becomes insane after conviction of a
capital offense, he shall not be executed until his recovery from the
lunacy, and under the statute, when the fact of insanity exists, a jury
shall be empaneled to try the question."
These cases clearly establish that, at common law, the determination of sanity to
be executed was a question for the jury.
3. State Constitutional Preservation of Trial by Jury on the Related Questions
of Competency to Stand Trial or Be Sentenced
These early cases also establish that, like most rights, the common law right to
a jury trial on the issue of sanity to be executed was not absolute; rather, it was
86. In so holding, the court stated:
We must assume that, in overruling this plea, the just and humane judge of the oyer
and terminer found nothing to raise a doubt in his mind as to the sanity of the prisoner
when he was called for sentence. If there was nothing to raise such a doubt, it was his
imperative duty to disregard a plea which could only serve to delay the judgment which
justice and the law demanded should follow the crime with due promptness.
Buccieri, 26 A. at 235-36.
87. 84 N.C. 722 (1881).
88. Id. at 722.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 723 (citing HALE, supra note 57, at 34; 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at *25).
92. Id. at 724.
93. 156 P. 800 (Colo. 1916).
94. Id. at 802.
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sensibly premised upon a judicial finding that the facts created reason to believe
that the defendant was then insane. This requirement is no different than the
threshold showing generally required to trigger the right to jury trial on the issue
of competency to stand trial under various state constitutions and statutes. The
following cases show that the right to jury trial on the issue of sanity in the
contexts of (1) competency to stand trial and (2) competency to be sentenced was
preserved with state constitutional language almost identical to that found in article
2, section 19 of the Oklahoma Constitution.
In Ex parte LaFlore," the Alabama Supreme Court held that the common law
recognized the right to trial by jury to determine a person's sanity (competency)
at the time of trial. LaFlore was charged with theft and entered alternative pleas
of not guilty and not guilty by reason of insanity. She later requested a hearing to
determine her mental competency to stand trial. A licensed psychiatrist and a
licensed psychologist both testified that petitioner was unable to cooperate with
counsel and assist in the preparation of her defense.
The trial judge initially found the petitioner competent to stand trial.' Upon
reconsideration, the judge ordered an independent examination of the petitioner and
scheduled a jury trial to resolve the issue. 7 The State obtained from the Alabama
Court of Criminal Appeals a writ of mandamus against the district court to prohibit
the jury trial proceeding."5 The Supreme Court of Alabama reversed, finding that
the right to a jury trial was preserved by the Alabama Constitution." The Court
reasoned:
Article I, § 11, Ala. Const. 1901, provides "that the right of trial by
jury shall remain inviolate." These right-to-jury-trial provisions have been
in all of Alabama's Constitutions, beginning with the constitution of 1819
and including those of 1861, 1865, 1868, and 1875.
Section 11 has been interpreted to provide for the right of jury trial in
those classes of cases in which that right existed at common law ....
In Edgerson v. State, the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that
accused persons were entitled to a jury trial at common law on the issue
of competency to stand trial.' w
After quoting from Blackstone, the Alabama Supreme Court went on to state that the
determination of competence to stand trial was, at common law, a jury question."'
In addition to citing Blackstone, the court relied upon an act passed by Parliament
declaring the issue to be one for the jury."° Ultimately, the court held:
95. 445 So. 2d 932 (Ala. 1983).
96. id. at 933.
97. Id.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 935.
100. Id. at 934 (citation omitted).
101. Id. at 934-35.
102. Id. The court explained the application of this statute in relation to an earlier case:
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Thus, both by the common law in Blackstone's time and through the
later Act of Parliament, the question of whether an accused was com-
petent to stand trial was for the jury. This right is preserved to the
citizens of Alabama by § I I of the Constitution of 1901.o"
We therefore conclude that the petitioner is constitutionally entitled
to a jury trial on the issue of her mental competency to stand trial. The
statutes in Article 2, Chapter 16, Title 15, Code 1975, should be
considered modified to the extent that they are in conflict with the
constitutional right to trial by jury."3
4. Common Law and Constitutional Rules Expressed in State Legislation
The right to a jury trial at common law, which arose in any case of doubt or
difficulty as to the question of sanity, is not only guaranteed by article 2, section
19 of the Oklahoma Constitution, it has also become part of the fabric of
Oklahoma's statutory law. A comparison of statutes on the related subjects of
alleged restoration of competency to stand trial and alleged restoration of sanity
at the time of sentencing makes this guarantee even more certain.
The Oklahoma Statutes require that if the trial court makes an initial finding of
doubt as to the accused's competency to stand trial, the issue must be tried by a
jury if demanded by the accused." Cases from the territorial period and early
Oklahoma statehood cast no doubt on this basic guarantee. In Maas v. Phillips,"5
the Supreme Court of the Oklahoma Territory held that "fi]f the court entertains
an honest doubt as to the sanity of a defendant when his case is called for trial.
. . it must defer the trial or sentence until after the question of the defendant's
sanity has been passed upon by a jury.""
That statute was relied on in Rex v. Little. Little was indicted for assault with intent
to murder, but the jury found him insane both at the time of the commission of the
offense and at the time of trial. The trial judge ordered him kept in custody under the
section of the Criminal Lunacy Act pertaining to insanity at the time of trial, the section
pertaining to insanity at the time of commission of the offense not being applicable to the
case. This action was found to be correct.
In the report of Rex v. Little, supra, there appears the following summary of the statute:
"By 39 & 40 Geo. Ill c. 94 s. I, it is enacted, That in case any person charged with
treason, murder, or felony, proving to be insane at the time of the commission of such
offence, be acquitted, the jury are to declare whether he was acquitted by them on account
of insanity; and if they so find the Court shall order him to be kept in custody till his
Majesty's pleasure be known, & c. By s. 2 it is enacted, That if upon the trial of any
person indicted for any offence, such person shall appear to the jury charged with such
indictment to be insane, it shall be lawful for the Court before whom any person shall be
brought to trial, as aforesaid, to direct such finding to be recorded, and thereupon to order
such person to be kept in strict custody until his Majesty's pleasure be known."
Id. at 935 (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 935.
104. 22 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1175.3(B), 1175.4(B) (Supp. 2000).
105. 1900 OK 68, 61 P. 1057.
106. Id. 14, 61 P. at 1058.
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Similarly, in Marshall v. Territory," the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
held the failure to impanel a jury, in the face of credible evidence to raise a doubt
of competency to stand trial, was reversible error. Significantly, the court
emphasized that under Oklahoma's statute, the court did not have the discretion to
decide whether or not to call a jury. t As stated by the court, "The only
contingency is, Does a doubt arise? This means, has information come to the court
through a proper channel ...that the defendant is insane, or if from personal
inspection or observation of the court ... then the law requires that a jury should
be impaneled.""'
Since this article is concerned in part with procedure in cases of alleged restoration
of sanity to be executed, the statutes governing the similar situation of restoration of
competency to stand trial, or the even more closely related issue of restoration of
sanity to be sentenced, are illuminating. In cases of alleged restoration of competency
to stand trial, the controlling statute requires that "[ijf the agency or institution reports
that the person appears to have achieved competency or is no longer incompetent...
the court shall hold another competency hearing to determine if the person has
achieved competency.." The reference to another competency hearing con-
templates the same type of post-examination competency hearing which is initially
provided, which includes the right to trial by jury if demanded.
The statutes relating to insanity at the time of sentencing have the same effect.
In cases where an allegation of present insanity is made prior to the court's
pronouncement of judgment, "if a doubt arise[s] as to the sanity of the defendant,
the court must order a jury to be impaneled from the jurors summoned and
returned for the term ... to inquire into the fact."'' . The statute further provides
that "[i]f the jury finds the defendant presently insane, the trial or judgment must
be suspended until he becomes sane......
From the general language defining the defendant's right to raise the issue
whenever he might appear for pronouncement of judgment, it logically follows that
if a legitimate "doubt" as to sanity is shown, the trial court has no discretion but
to impanel the jury to determine the fact. This reading in no way allows the
feigning defendant to repeatedly escape justice, as some argue. If the defendant
is adjudged by the jury to be competent to stand trial (or sane to be sentenced, as
the case may be), the criminal proceedings continue and judgment is pronounced.
Conversely, if he is again adjudged insane, judgment would naturally be suspended
and a new commitment order entered.
Now contrast these authorities with the literal language of title 22, section 1008
of the Oklahoma Statutes, governing sanity to be executed. This statute allows the
Governor to issue a death warrant (and the warden to execute it) based solely on
107. 1909 OK CR 43, 101 P. 139.
108. Id. I - , 101 P. at 143.
109. Id.
110. 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1175.6(A)(3) (Supp. 2000).
Ill. Id. § 1162.
112. Id. § 1167.
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the mental-hospital superintendent's unsworn allegation that the prisoner has
regained his sanity and is therefore fit for execution."3 As already mentioned,
Ford v. Wainwright plainly held that a prisoner has an Eighth Amendment
procedural right to contest this allegation in some judicial forum prior to his
execution. A literal reading of the language in section 1008 would render the
statute unconstitutional under Ford.
Ford does guarantee a judicial hearing, but this only settles half the question of
how to follow the procedure for restoration of sanity under section 1008. Because
article 2, section 19 of Oklahoma's Constitution preserved the "inviolate" right to
jury trial as it existed at common law (with exceptions already noted), the prisoner
has a further right under the state's fundamental law to demand that the question
of his alleged restoration of sanity be tried before a jury. The proper interpretation
of the statutory procedure set forth at sections 1005-1008 is one that preserves and
gives effect to this constitutional right rather than one that judicially construes it
into oblivion. As the Oklahoma Supreme Court stated in Gilbert Central Corp. v.
State,"4 "Where there are two possible interpretations in the construction of a
statute, one of which would render the statute unconstitutional, the Court should
adopt the construction which upholds the statute, unless the repugnancy to the
constitution is shown beyond a reasonable doubt.""1
5
The common law required that if the question of a condemned prisoner's sanity
presented a case of doubt or difficulty, the prisoner had a right to submit the
question to a jury. From this, it appears that a condemned prisoner might be
required to show, at most, a doubt as to whether he has regained sanity before he
is entitled to a jury trial.
C. The Last, Unpublished Word: Van Woudenberg v. District Court
After the warden and the SCU superintendent alleged that Sammy Van Wouden-
berg had regained his sanity, the trial court held an initial hearing. The trial court
found that, under Ford v. Wainwright, Van Woudenberg had the right to appointed
counsel and the right to contest the warden's allegation of regained sanity in a non-
jury trial."6 In a related ruling denying the State's request for an execution date,
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals also prescribed a non-jury trial of the
issue. The court held that Van Woudenberg must affirmatively request the hearing
within a specified time in order to contest the allegation." '7 In the absence of
such a request, the court would lift a stay of execution and the Governor would be
allowed to set an execution date."' The court further held that if Van Wouden-
berg's counsel filed a request for hearing, the trial court must conduct the hearing
113. Id. § 1008.
114. 1986OK 6,716 P.2d 654.
115. Id.I 7, 716 P.2d at 658.
116. In re Van Woudenberg, No. C-94-585 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Dec. 20, 2001) (minute order granting
application to appoint counsel).
117. Van Woudenberg v. State, No. F-84-95, at 7 (Okla. Crim. App. Apr. 12, 2001) (order holding
the setting of execution date in abeyance).
118. Id. at 8.
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within a specified time and enter findings of fact and conclusions of law.' The
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals would then review the findings of the trial
court; if it determined the prisoner was sane, it would set the execution date."
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals entered these preliminary orders
before we"' had the opportunity to fully research the issue of whether Van
Woudenberg had the right to a jury trial. In a later pretrial motion hearing, we
attempted to invoke this right as it existed at common law.' By attaching to our
demand for trial the affidavit of a competent psychiatrist stating his opinion (based
on a recent evaluation) that Sammy Van Woudenberg was presently insane,12 we
satisfied the common law requirement of supporting the plea of insanity with an
affidavit from a credible source. We thereby created a doubt of present sanity as
a matter of law and were entitled to a jury trial on the issue."4
On the strength of the foregoing authorities, we requested that the Pittsburg
County District Court submit the question of restoration of sanity (which, like the
initial question, is a question of present sanity) to a jury." The trial court denied
our motion. We then appealed that ruling on a petition for extraordinary writ of
prohibition or writ of mandamus, which the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals
denied in an unpublished order. 2 While the order is not binding precedent in
Oklahoma, it is relevant for the purposes of this article.
In its analysis of Van Woudenberg's request for a jury trial, the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals mischaracterized the question as one arising purely by the
force of common law. Proceeding from this faulty premise, the court reasoned that
the statutory procedure abrogated the common law right to jury trial. The court
stated that "the issue of a capital defendant's competency to be executed is not a
matter of common law, but has been codified in 22 O.S. 1991, § 1005 et seq.''2
The court then noted that, in 1999, officials at the penitentiary found that Van
Woudenberg had been restored to competency. "' Under these circumstances,
according to the court, the following procedural provisions of title 22, section 1008
of the Oklahoma Statutes govern: "'When the defendant recovers his reason the
119. Id. at 7.
120. Id.
121. "We," throughout the remainder of the article, refers to Van Woudenberg's appellate counsel.
122. Motion for Jury Trial of Sanity to Be Executed at I, In Re Van Woudenberg, No. C-94-585
(Okla. Dist. Ct. May 16, 2001).
123. Notice and Plea of Present Insanity, In Re Van Woudenberg, No. C-94-585 (Okla. Dist. Ct.
May 10, 2001).
124. Cf. Ban" v. State, 359 So. 2d 334 (Miss. 1978) (holding that an affidavit of a competent expert
expressing an opinion that a prisoner is insane is sufficient to raise doubt and require a jury trial of the
issue); Berwick v. State, 1951 OK CR _, 229 P.2d 604 (holding that positive affidavits alleging
present insanity are sufficient to raise doubt and require the impaneling of a jury).
125. Motion for Jury Trial of Sanity to Be Executed at 1, In Re Van Woudenberg, No. C-94-585
(Okla. Dist. Ct. May 10, 2001).
126. Van Woudenberg v. Dist. Court, No. PR-2001-636 (Okla. Crim. App. July 9, 2001) (order
denying petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus).
127. Id. at 5.
128. Id, at 6.
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superintendent of such hospital must certify that fact to the Governor, who must
thereupon issue to the warden his warrant, appointing a day for the execution of
the judgment."'" The court found that prison officials properly followed the
statutory mandates and that the district court properly ruled that Van Woudenberg
was merely "entitled to a non-jury hearing on the issue of his competency to be
executed." The court reasoned that, based on the statutory provisions, Oklahoma
does not require "a second jury trial after the defendant has recovered his
reason."
' 0
We argued that interpreting the statutes in this manner violated the prisoner's
state constitutional right to a jury trial. On this issue, the court ruled that because
the issue of competency to be executed arises after the trial, the relevant state
constitutional rights to a jury trial did not attach:
This Court has held that in criminal cases, the right to a jury trial set
forth in Article 2, § 19 of the Oklahoma Constitution "relates only to
the determination of guilt." Exceptions to this rule are specifically set
forth in the state statutes. These exceptions are limited and include 22
O.S. 1991, § 1175.1 et. seq., Determination of Competency, which
addresses the determination of a defendant's competency to participate
in the criminal proceedings against him from the time of arrest through
trial. The right to a jury trial on the issue of competency to stand trial
is specifically set forth in 22 O.S. 1991 §§ 1175.2(B)(2) and 1175.4
The issue in the present case, competency to be executed, is distin-
guishable as it arises post-trial, therefore the provisions of § 1175.1 et.
seq. are not applicable."'
If only the issue were as simple as the court portrayed it. The argument for a
right to jury trial would indeed be difficult to sustain if it were weakly premised
on the claim that a court is bound to choose between the requirements of the
common law and the plain language of the statute. In such cases, as the court
deftly pointed out, the statute itself controls. But to reach its result here, the court
made a further stretch (citing nothing but its own recent case law) to dispense with
the claim that article 2, section 19 of the Oklahoma Constitution also requires a
jury trial to settle the question of present sanity."2 The court did so with the
retort "that in criminal cases, the right to a jury trial set forth in Article 2, § 19 of
the Oklahoma Constitution 'relates only to the determination of guilt."'" 3 The
court cited Romano v. State" for this dubious proposition. In Romano, however,
the court rejected a very different claim. It rejected the claim that the right to jury
129. Id.
130. Id. at 7.
131. Id. at 7 (citations omitted).
132. See id. at 5.
133. Id. at 7.
134. 1995 OK CR 74, 909 P.2d 92.
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trial found in article 2, section 19 was violated by requiring a jury to express its
finding of aggravating circumstances in a capital case on a verdict form."
Based on this unusual case, the court in Van Woudenberg reasoned that a jury
trial is only constitutionally required in criminal cases for the "determination of
guilt."" Because the criminal proceeding at issue was for the determination of
something other than guilt, the court reasoned that there was no constitutional right
to jury trial in this case.' The court's line of reasoning is flawed on a number
of levels. The court failed to explain how its sweeping claim about the limited
scope of article 2, section 19 can be squared with the long-established doctrine that
article 2, section 19 extended constitutional protection for the jury trial right as it
existed at common law, with the sole exception being those express limitations
found in the text of the constitutional provision itself. The court simply dis-
regarded the wealth of authority interpreting article 2, section 19 of the Oklahoma
Constitution, and identical provisions in other state constitutions, as preserving the
right to jury trial as it existed at common law. ' Instead, the court cast the
argument aside with the inapposite citation to its own statement in Romano, a
recent case raising a completely different claim.
The jury trial on the question of sanity to be executed was undeniably a right
(limited by the "doubt" threshold, of course) at common law. Whether it was an
"initial" inquiry into present sanity or an inquiry made upon a claim of "re-
storation" of sanity is of no consequence at all, except to those who are bothered
by its inexpediency. The question to be determined was present sanity to be
executed. Upon a showing of doubt, this matter clearly must be tried by jury if the
prisoner demands it. A legislative enactment purporting to alter the constitutionally
prescribed mode of procedure, such as section 1008, simply abridges the
constitutional rights guaranteed by article 2, section 19 of the Oklahoma
Constitution. The court could have applied the statute to avoid its constitutional
infirmity by simply acknowledging that if any dispute arose as to the alleged
restoration of sanity, upon a proper showing of doubt, the matter must be tried to
a jury according to the traditional reading of article 2, section 19. Instead, the
court dispensed with this traditional reading of the constitutional text without even
raising a serious argument against it.
V. A Cruel and Unusual Twist: How Ford v. Wainwright Dishonored One
Common Law Tradition While It Constitutionalized Another
The common law authorities clearly prove that the capital prisoner's right to a
trial by jury to determine present sanity to be executed was an established feature
of "due process of law" at the time of the adoption of the Fifth, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. But in a series of poorly decided Supreme Court cases,
135. Id. 9 105, 909 P.2d at 125.
136. Van Woudenberg, No. PR-2001-636, at 7 (order denying petition for writ of prohibition and/or
mandamus).
137. Id.
138. See supra Part IV.B.I; see also Keeter v. State, 1921 OK 197, 198 P. 866.
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the Court entrusted the availability of this ancient right to the uncharitable fortune
of judicial "discretion" (a nether realm from which few fundamental rights are ever
heard again). The right became so little recognized by the late twentieth century
that it was virtually dispensed with altogether by the Supreme Court's opinion in
Ford v. Wainwright.' An examination of these Supreme Court cases reveals
how the right was ignored and why the decisions diminishing the right are not
accurate representations of the common law or the meaning of "due process" of
law. Because all important constitutional questions always remain open, I submit
the following discussion of those decisions to trace the unfortunate path by which
an important right was brought to the ignominious ebb where it can be found
today.
A. The Ignoble Error: Nobles v. Georgia and Corruption of the Common Law
In Nobles v. Georgia," the Supreme Court held, for the first time, that a state
trial court's refusal to impanel a jury to try a capital prisoner's sanity was not a
denial of due process of law under the Fourteenth Amendment."" While Nobles
has since been cited as rejecting any right to trial by jury, neither the holding itself
nor the cases relied upon support this broad reading. Instead, Nobles and the
authorities it cited are very limited and can be properly read only to recognize an
obvious rule: that an unsupported plea of insanity, which fails to raise any doubt
at the time it is entered, does not trigger an absolute right to a trial by jury either
at common law or under the Fourteenth Amendment's Due Process Clause.
Elizabeth Nobles was found guilty of murder and sentenced to death. The trial
court apparently suspended the sentence for a period of time, and the case later
returned to the court for the pronouncement of the sentence." 2 On the date of the
appearance for resentencing, a petition was presented to the trial court praying that
the sentence not be pronounced and alleging that Nobles "is now insane. '""" It
was further alleged on Nobles' behalf that her execution while insane would violate
the due process of law guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment." An ad-
ditional plea was entered asserting that due process of law required the impaneling
of a jury to try the question.""
139. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
140. 168 U.S. 398 (1897).
141. Id, at 409.
142. Id. at 399.
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. The plea read:
Petitioner says that it is essential to due process of law within the meaning of the above
requirement that a jury be empanelled on the issue now tendered by this petition, and that
trial take place before a judge of the Superior Court of the State of Georgia, according to
the due and regular form of proceedings in our courts. Whenever an issue of fact is made
in a Superior Court in the State of Georgia the trial of the questions thereby raised is a
function of the Superior Court of the county having jurisdiction, and that the trial of the
question raised by this petition is a function of the Superior Court of Twiggs County, in
which said court the said Mrs. Nobles was convicted of murder.
20021
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2002
OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
The trial court denied the petition, and the Supreme Court of Georgia af-
firmed." The case came to the United States Supreme Court on writ of error.
The Supreme Court stated the relevant issue as follows:
[T]he only question which we are called upon to determine is whether,
after a regular conviction and sentence, a suggestion of a then existing
insanity is made, it is necessary, in order to constitute due process of
law, that the question so presented should be tried by a jury in a
judicial proceeding surrounded by all the safeguards and requirements
of a common law jury trial, and even although by the state law full
and adequate administrative and quasi judicial process is created for
the purpose of investigating the suggestion.47
Stating the question in this way, the Supreme Court quickly assumed "its
obvious unsoundness by pointing to the absurd conclusion which would result from
its establishment."'4" The Court reasoned that if a suggestion of insanity after
sentencing created an absolute right to a jury trial of the issue, the convict would
have the power to make "suggestion after suggestion of insanity, to be followed
by trial upon trial."'4
The Court then went on to consider Blackstone and other common law
authorities, referenced throughout this article, asserting that the common law
imposed an imperative duty to try the insanity of a convict by judge and jury."
Considering these authorities, the Court agreed that an insane person could not
suffer punishment at common law.'5' However, the Court distinguished the
question of what method should determine the existence of sanity after a
conviction and sentence have been imposed."2
The Supreme Court concluded that a jury was not required to try the issue upon
a mere suggestion of insanity, where no factual showing was offered in support of
the plea:
Id. at 400.
146. Id. at 401.
147. Id. at 405.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 405-06.
150. Id. at 406. The text specifically referenced by the Court reads as follows:
Also, if a man in his sound memory commits a capital offence, and before arraignment
for it, he becomes mad, he ought not to be arraigned for it; because he is not able to plead
to it with that advice and caution that he ought. And if, after he has pleaded, the prisoner
becomes mad, he shall not be tried; for how can he make his defence? If, after he be tried
and found guilty, he lose his senses before judgment, judgment shall not be pronounced;
and if, after judgment, he becomes of non-sane memory, execution shall be stayed: for
peradventure, says the humanity of the English law, had the prisoner been of sound
memory he might have alleged something in stay of judgment or execution.
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In other words, by the common law, if, after conviction and sentence,
a suggestion of insanity was made, not that the judge to whom it was
made should, as a matter of right, proceed to summon a jury and have
another trial, but that he should take such action as, in his discretion,
he deemed best."3
For this proposition, the Supreme Court cited two cases discussed at length
earlier in this article. They are mentioned again here to demonstrate that the
Nobles case was subsequently read in a way that was inconsistent with its actual
holding. The Supreme Court first cited Laros v. Commonwealth, in which a
suggestion of insanity was made after the verdict." The Court quoted portions
of Laros that reasoned that "'no right of trial by jury [was] involved in the ques-
tion.""" Because a jury had found a verdict against the plea of insanity when
used as a defense to conviction, the Laros court reasoned that "'subsequent insanity
cannot be set up in disproof of the conviction. The plea at this stage is only an
appeal to the humanity of the court to postpone the punishment until a recovery
takes place . . . .""' The Supreme Court further cited Laros's reasoning that a
rule allowing repeated pleas of insanity would be "'inconsistent with the due ad-
ministration of justice."' 
15 7
The Supreme Court also relied on Bonds v. State, in which a convicted prisoner
claiming lunacy requested a jury to try the issue of his sanity.'" In Bonds, the
court "denied him the privilege of a jury to try the question of his sanity or
insanity, and passed upon the accused the sentence of death."'"9 Denying this
privilege, the court reasoned that a jury trial is not an absolute right and that
"'inspection by the court is one of the legal modes of trying the fact of insanity
[and nothing showed] that the discretion of the court, in adopting the mode
pursued, was erroneously exercised."""a)
The Supreme Court concluded its discussion with a narrow holding that Nobles'
unsupported plea of insanity did not give rise to any absolute right at common law
to have the question of present sanity submitted to the jury.6' Specifically, the
Court reasoned:
It being demonstrated by reason and authority that at common law a
suggestion made after verdict and sentence of insanity did not give rise
to an absolute right on the part of a convict to have such issue tried
before the court and to a jury, but addressed itself to the discretion of
the judge, it follows that the manner in which such question should be
153. Id. at 407.
154. Id. (citing Laros v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. 200, 210 (1877)).
155. Id. at 407 (quoting Laros, 84 Pa. at 210).
156. Id. (quoting Laros, 84 Pa. at 210).
157. Id. at 407-08 (quoting Laros, 84 Pa. at 210).
158. Id. at 408 (citing Bonds v. State, 8 Tenn. 142, I Mart. & Yer. 137 (Tenn. 1827)).
159. Id. (citing Bonds, 8 Tenn. at 143-44, 1 Mart. & Yer. at 138).
160. Id. at 409 (quoting Bonds, 8 Tenn. at 144, I Mart. & Yer. at 139).
161. Id.
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determined was purely a matter of legislative regulation. It was,
therefore a subject within the control of the State of Georgia. Because
we have confined our opinion exclusively to' the question before us,
that is, the right arising on a suggestion of insanity after sentence, we
must not be understood as implying that a different rule would prevail
after verdict and up to and including sentence, or as passing upon the
question whether, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a State is without
power to relegate the decision of a question of insanity, when raised
before conviction, to such apt and special tribunal as the law might
deem best.'"
B. The Limits of Common Law Discretion
A careful examination of both Laros and Bonds, the cases cited in Nobles, does
not establish that the common law right to trial by jury was nonexistent. Instead,
these two cases establish that the right was not absolute. In fact, both cases
recognized that judicial discretion to deny a jury on the issue of sanity had well-
established limits.'" Because the cases were fact specific to the plea that was
entered and the manner in which it was put in, both cases held only that the
denial of the jury trial was not error on the record presented.'
In Laros, the court noted that the plea was put in by the prisoner at the
conclusion of his trial, at which his defense was insanity. 6 It appears from the
opinion that this was in the same term of court, as little as a few days after the
date of conviction." Moreover, the opinion indicates that nothing was presented
in the way of new or different factual information that had not already been
presented to the trial jury."' The trial court interrogated the prisoner to its
satisfaction and clearly found that no doubt had been raised by the plea.'"
These were the circumstances in which the jury was properly denied. But the
Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recognized that "[i]f a case of real doubt arise,
a just judge will not fail to relieve his own conscience by submitting the fact to
a jury.'"
Bonds v. State contains a very similar statement, which also spells out the
limits upon common law judges' discretion in denying a jury trial in this type of
case. In denying the jury trial in this instance, the Bonds court stated:
But the Court, upon inspection of the prisoner, and upon consideration
of the case, because nothing was shown to render it probable that
162. Id.
163. Laros v. Commonwealth, 84 Pa. 200, 211 (1877); Bonds, 8 Tenn. at 144, I Mart. & Yer. at
138.
164. Laros, 84 Pa. at 211; Bonds, 8 Tenn. at 144-45, i Mart. & Yer. at 139.
165. Laros, 84 Pa. at 201.
166. Id. at 204-05.
167. Id. at 205.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 211 (emphasis added).
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defendant was a lunatic, or to make that matter doubtful, refused to
allow the prisoner his plea aforesaid, and denied him the privilege of
a jury at this time, to the question of his sanity or insanity, and
proceeded to pronounce the sentence of death accordingly." °
Thus, in Bonds, the plea failed to raise a factual doubt, and it is therefore
understandable that the Supreme Court of Tennessee found no error in the trial
court's ruling. The Tennessee Supreme Court quoted approvingly from William
Hawkins' Pleas of the Crown and recognized the judge's duty to impanel a jury
"'in cases of importance, doubt, or difficulty.".. And one should also recall the
case of Commonwealth v. Buccieri, in which the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
eloquently echoed this same limitation on the tyranny of discretion: "If there was
nothing to raise such a doubt, it was his imperative duty to disregard a plea which
could only serve to delay the judgment which justice and the law demanded
should follow the crime with due promptness.'
7 2
Rather than disparage the right to jury trial, as many others would later do in
their names, the judges deciding Laros, Bonds, and Buccieri knew the limits of
common law discretion and assumed that future judges would observe these
limitations.'" Even in the 1935 case of Denton v. State, the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals found error in the trial court's denial of a jury to try the
defendant's present sanity to be sentenced and held judicial discretion in check by
following the common law:
When the motion is made and supported by such a showing, then a
legal doubt of defendant's sanity arises, and it is the duty of the trial
court to impanel a jury and to try the issue. While a trial judge may
personally have no doubt of defendant's sanity, yet if the motion and
showing in support thereof is substantially as outlined, it is sufficient
legally to raise a doubt. In such a case, a refusal to submit the issue
to the jury is an abuse of discretion .... While the trial court has a
discretion, it is not arbitrary or absolute.'"
But in later cases, when appellate judges faced a choice between the expense
of error and the expanse of discretion, discretion proved the more tempting
option.
C. Discretion Defeats Itself - The First Time As Tragedy, the Second Time As
Farce
In Nobles, the Supreme Court issued a narrow decision and applied its
reasoning to the precise question presented. Unfortunately, the discussion of the
170. Bonds v. State, 8 Tenn. 142, 143-44. I Mart. & Yer. 137, 138 (Tenn. 1827) (emphasis added).
171. Id. at 144, I Mart. & Yer. at 139 (quoting HAWKINS, supra note 57, at 3).
172. Commonwealth v. Buccieri, 26 A. 228, 235-36 (Pa. 1893).
173. Id.
174. 1935 OK CR -, 53 P.2d 1136.
175. Id. I -, 53 P.2d at 1140 (emphasis added).
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question in that case condemned it to a half century of judicial inattention and
indifference. In fact, by the time the Supreme Court decided Solesbee v.
Balkcom,76 the Court was prepared to uphold a legislative enactment that
removed the legal question of sanity to be executed from the judicial forum
altogether. The Supreme Court willingly accepted this legislative ouster by
painting a truly aberrant portrait of the practice at common law, likening the post-
conviction sanity determination to the power of the executive clemency. "
Another thirty-six years would pass before the Supreme Court reclaimed the
legal question of present sanity as a proper subject of judicial review in Ford v.
Wainwright.," The Court held that the Eighth Amendment incorporated the
common law rule prohibiting execution of the insane and that some judicial means
of enforcing this right must be recognized. But in the careless hands of these
latter-day jurists, the common law's limited discretion to deny a jury trial of this
issue was supplanted by the assertion that no such right could be found at
common law. The Supreme Court then essentially loosed a procedural free-for-all
of federalism. The individual states would be allowed to devise their own judicial
procedures, observing certain (very) minimal constitutional requirements of basic
fairness, all to be enforced by the benevolent authors of Ford and their
successors.
The Ford Court made no mention of the ancient rule of limited judicial
discretion to deny a jury trial of the issue, which was implicitly recognized in
Nobles v. Georgia'" and the cases it cited. In an analysis remarkably lacking
in scholarship, the Court ignored the common law procedural right of trial by jury
and struggled to articulate a suitable vehicle for judicial enforcement of the
substantive right it had just enshrined in the Eighth Amendment. The Court's
analysis of the procedural question includes the somewhat gratuitous observation
that "[w]e do not here suggest that only a full trial on the issue of sanity will
suffice to protect the federal interests; we leave to the State the task of developing
176. 339 U.S. 9 (1950).
177. Specifically, the court reasoned:
Postponement of execution because of insanity bears a close affinity not to trial for a
crime but rather to reprieves of sentences in general. The power to reprieve has usually
sprung from the same source as the power to pardon. Power of executive clemency in this
country undoubtedly derived from the practice as it had existed in England. Such power
has traditionally rested in governors or the President, although some of that power is often
delegated to agencies such as pardon or parole boards. Seldom, if ever, has this power of
executive clemency been subjected to review by the courts.
We are unable to say that it offends due process for a state to deem its Governor an
"apt and special tribunal" to pass upon a question so closely related to powers that from
the beginning have been entrusted to governors. And here the governor had the aid of
physicians specially trained in appraising the elusive and often deceptive symptoms of
insanity. It is true that governors and physicians might make errors of judgment. But the
search for truth in this field is always beset by difficulties that may beget error. Even
judicial determination of sanity might be wrong.
Id. at 11-12 (citations omitted).
178. 477 U.S. 399 (1986).
179. 168 U.S. 398, 407 (1897).
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appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction upon its execution of
sentences."'"
Without any mention of the mode of procedure that prevailed for centuries at
common law, Justice Powell wrote in a concurring opinion that he believed "a
constitutionally acceptable procedure may be far less formal than a trial.'...
Justice Powell emphasized the states' judicial leeway in determining the proper
procedure, explaining that states need only "provide an impartial officer or board
that can receive evidence and argument. -1
X2
Indeed, why should a Supreme Court Justice trouble with an investigation of
centuries of jurisprudence when a strongly held "view" of the most' expedient
method will suffice? Justice Powell and the rest of the Court seemed oblivious
to the fact that the common law provided an exceptionally plain answer to the
question of what procedure should be followed. The common law rule was
simple: in cases of difficulty or doubt, the question of sanity to be executed shall
be tried by jury. Tarnished by judicial indifference, trod upon by generations of
careless lawgivers and opinion writers, the right to jury trial remains an
undeniable part of the procedure at common law.
D. Original Intent: Jury Trial As the "Due Process of Law"
The framers of the U.S. Constitution would have studied the statements of
Blackstone, Hale, Hawkins, and Coke, which are cited repeatedly in this article.
The authors and advocates of the amendments to the Constitution intended to
preserve the best elements of our common law heritage in the Fifth Amendment's
guarantee of "due process of law." That same simple phrase was later extended
to restrain the policies of the states after the Civil War. In fact, in Foster v.
Marshall," the Oklahoma Supreme Court noted that "'[tihe very close relation-
ship between due process and the procedure at common law was stressed in
opinion after opinion. This was but natural in view of the background of the early
state courts, and the fact that the colonial courts had consistently proceeded
according to it."""
Concerning the constitutional provisions prohibiting legislative suspension of
the writ of habeas corpus, Justice Tarsney, in the early Oklahoma case of In re
Patzwald,"' stated:
That provision of the constitution is a guaranty that the right of the
writ of habeas corpus should remain as it existed at the common law,
and should not be curtailed by legislative enactment, or by subtle and
metaphysical judicial interpretation, and legislatures can no more
180. Ford, 477 U.S. at 416-17.
181. Id. at 427 (Powell, J., concurring).
182. Id.
183. 1930 OK 73, 284 P. 882.
184. Id. 1 16, 284 P. at 884 (quoting RODNEY L. MoTr, DUE PROCESS OF LAW 208 (1926)).
185. 1897 OK 74, 50 P. 139.
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prevent its application to cases where it would have been applicable
at common law than they can abrogate the right of trial by jury."
Mere legislation is not the measure of "due process." While not every form of
modern procedure can (or should) be traced to an analogous inquiry at the
common law, those forms that were well established at common law were clearly
the law of the land. Thus, these common law procedures were included by and
through the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments in the phrase "due process of law."
Justice Curtis made this point in his opinion for the U.S. Supreme Court in Den
ex dem. Murray v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., ' a case discussing
whether a warrant issued in conformity with a congressional act constituted "due
process of law." Justice Curtis reasoned that Congress was not "free to make any
process 'due process of law,' by its mere will.""' Instead, he suggested the
Court must examine only the Constitution itself and the common law of England
to ascertain whether the process was due process of law.'
In the uncommon cases raising the question of a prisoner's sanity to be
executed, American judges have obscured, ignored, and finally discarded the
ancient common law right to trial by jury. Successive generations of jurists first
failed to consider the common law authorities with adequate care, and then failed
to consider them at all. The rarity of such cases, the swiftness of judgment and
sentence in earlier times, the frequent denial of counsel to the condemned
prisoner, and a host of other factors may have contributed to the misunderstanding
of these authorities over the years. But "due process of law" in sanity proceedings
undoubtedly includes a right to trial by jury in cases of difficulty or doubt.
To suggest this today, of course, may invite a puzzled look or worse from the
intended audience. The procedural dictum of Ford - heedless legal contrivance
that it is - reigns supreme. But if advocates in future cases confront the courts
with these authorities and claim for their clients a right guaranteed by the
Constitution and its great progenitor, the English common law, this discussion
might dimly light the way.
186. Id. 1 12, 50 P. at 142.
187. 59 U.S. 272 (1855).
188. Id. at 276.
189. Id. at 277. The Court held:
It is manifest that it was not left to the legislative power to enact any process which
might be devised. The article is a restraint on the legislative as well as on the executive
and judicial powers of the government, and cannot be so construed as to leave congress
free to make any process 'due process of law,' by its mere will. To what principles, then,
are we to resort to ascertain whether this process, enacted by congress, is due process?
To this the answer must be twofold. We must examine the constitution itself, to see
whether this process be in conflict with any of its provisions. If not found to be so, we
must look to those settled usages and modes of proceeding existing in the common and
statute law of England, before the emigration of our ancestors, and which are shown not
to have been unsuited to their civil and political condition by having been acted on by
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VI. Appointment of Counsel and Forensic Assistance in Sanity Proceedings
A. The Prisoner's Access to Counsel and Forensic Assistance
Under the Eighth Amendment, as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Ford,
capital prisoners subject to sanity-determination proceedings are entitled to
representation by counsel. Oklahoma law requires that indigent death row prisoners
in such proceedings be appointed counsel pursuant to the Oklahoma Indigent
Defense Act,'o which authorizes the Executive Director of the Oklahoma
Indigent Defense System (OIDS) to assign counsel to represent the prisoner."'
In the Van Woudenberg case, the Executive Director assigned the case to the OIDS
Capital Post-Conviction Division."
The landmark case of Ake v. Oklahoma"' established that, under the Fourteenth
Amendment's Due Process Clause, the indigent accused in a criminal trial is
entitled to expert psychiatric assistance at public expense if his sanity is likely to
be a "significant factor" in his defense at trial.' Subsequent cases suggest that
Ake's holding extends to include any form of expert or investigative assistance
necessary to an adequate defense. 5 Ake initially allowed state trial judges to
decide the question of whether such assistance would be provided upon a proper
motion by defense counsel." However, legislative amendments have largely
supplanted that practice by requiring Oklahoma's public-defense agencies to
administer the funds and make their own determinations of when expert or
investigative assistance will be used in a particular case.9
190. 22 OKLA. STAT. §§ 1355-1368 (Supp. 2000).
191. Id. § 1355.4; see also Van Woudenberg v. Taylor, No. 95,807 (Okla. Mar. 15, 2001) (order
assigning the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System to represent Van Woudenberg).
192. In re Van Woudenberg, No. C-94-585 (Okla. Dist. Ct. July 10, 2001) (findings of fact and
conclusions of law).
193. 470 U.S. 68 (1985).
194. Id. at 83.
195. See Tibbs v. State, 1991 OK CR 115, 819 P.2d 1372 (extending Ake to include experts
necessary for an adequate defense upon proper showing).
196. See Rogers v. State, 1995 OK CR 8, 890 P.2d 959 (finding that defense's request for expert
assistance was properly directed to trial court).
197. See Fitzgerald v. State, 1998 OK CR 68, 972 P.2d 1157; see also 22 OKLA. STAT. § 1355.4(D)
(Supp. 1999) (giving the Executive Director of the Oklahoma Indigent Defense System the authority to
provide expert, investigative, or other necessary services to indigent criminal defendants and attorneys
appointed pursuant to the Act). The public defenders of Oklahoma and Tulsa counties are granted similar
authority by title 19, section 138.8 of the Oklahoma Statutes. Funding for this type of assistance is
provided to each agency through legislative appropriations or use of the county court fund. Although the
Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals has held that such requests are to be submitted to the trial judge,
Judge Lumpkin gave this explanation of the current procedure in his opinion concurring in the result in
Fitzgerald:
Under the current statutory framework, a judge is not to be involved in authorizing or
compensating expert witnesses within the context of the facts presented in this case. That
budget is to be established by the governing board of the Court fund for the Public
Defender's office. Granted, that Court fund board would consist of a District Judge,
Associate District Judge and District Court Clerk of the County as set out in 20 O.S.
1991, § 1302. But by its repeal of Section 464 of Title 22, the Legislature has changed
20021
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The determination of a capital prisoner's sanity to be executed is a "hazardous
guess""' in which the use of psychological and psychiatric experts is essential to
a full and fair determination of the question. For this reason, the indigent capital
prisoner is entitled to assistance of one or more psychological and/or psychiatric
experts to conduct mental status evaluations, consult with counsel, and provide
relevant testimony on the question of sanity.
Sanity is ultimately a legal determination rather than a medical one. But the
cognitive factors defining legal insanity in Bingham v. State'" require a complete
understanding of the prisoner's present mental functioning, including how that
functioning may be impaired by recognized forms of mental disease or disor-
der.'n Comprehensive mental-health observation and examination of the prisoner
by competent mental-health professionals is an indispensable feature of a full and
fair sanity-determination procedure. Oklahoma law clearly answers the question
of whether the prisoner is entitled to this type of assistance. Even if the indigent
prisoner is represented by retained counsel rather than the public defender, he is
certainly entitled to such assistance if counsel can demonstrate the prisoner's
inability to pay."'
B. The State's Right to Evaluate the Prisoner
Because the prisoner's sanity is at issue in such a proceeding, the State probably
has a corresponding right to retain psychological or psychiatric experts and to have
those experts evaluate the prisoner's mental condition. 2 A prisoner probably
the procedure. Because of this change in procedure established by the Legislature, the
analysis set forth in Fitzgerald, relating to the trial judge, is no longer applicable within
the State of Oklahoma. The only time the District Court should become involved in the
issue of funding, as it relates to the Public Defender, is if the Public Defender believes
insufficient funds have been provided to fulfill his or her statutory and constitutional role.
An action could be filed in the District Court to mandamus the providing of those funds.
However, other than the sufficiency of the overall budget, the individual decisions relating
to the expenditure of those funds is the same for the Public Defender in Oklahoma and
Tulsa counties as it is for the Executive Director of O.I.D.S.
Fitzgerald, 1998 OK CR 68, 1 7, 972 P.2d at 1177 (Lumpkin, J., concurring). The majority in Fitzgerald
declared that it was not concerned
with the technicalities of who pays and what procedures for payment are followed, but
with the clear intention that all defendants are entitled to necessary expert assistance when
that constitutes a basic defense tool. By extending Ake, we have ensured that the
Legislature's intent is preserved, and indigent defendants in all counties of Oklahoma have
access to the basic tools necessary for an adequate defense.
Id. 1 16, 972 P.2d at 1165.
198. Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 23 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
199. 1946 OK CR -, I - , 169 P.2d 311, 314. The Bingham test and other prevailing tests
for insanity to be executed are discussed infra Part VII.
200. Id.
201. See Spain v. Dist. Court, 1994 OK CR 36, 1I I, 882 P.2d 79. 81 (holding that an indigent
defendant represented by retained counsel is entitled to a transcript at public expense based on a showing
that the defendant is personally unable to pay the costs of the transcript).
202. See Traywicks v. State, 1996 OK CR 54, 927 P.2d 1062. The court in Traywicks, quoting
Estelle v. Smith, stated that
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol55/iss1/2
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does not have the right to refuse such an examination, though he can obviously
limit the evaluation by refusing to answer questions or perform other tasks
requested by the State's examiner.
The State's right to a psychological examination is limited, however, by the
scope of the inquiry before the court. In Estelle v. Smith,'3 the U.S. Supreme
Court recognized that a criminal defendant's privilege against self-incrimination
and right to counsel attach to psychological examinations conducted in connection
with criminal proceedings.' This protection logically extends to examinations
for sanity to be executed. Estelle essentially requires that the prisoner be given a
Miranda warning concerning the nature and scope of the mental examination, that
his counsel be notified that the examination will be conducted, and that the
prisoner be afforded the right to consult with counsel concerning whether to submit
to the examination.'
Despite the fact of his conviction, the prisoner may also refuse to answer
questions concerning his involvement in the crime itself. In Traywicks v. State,'
the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals observed the following about the
limitations imposed by Estelle:
[W]hile the defendant may be compelled to answer questions about his
mental health, a constitutional violation may occur if the defendant is
compelled to reveal details of the crime itself to the State's mental
health expert. This distinction makes sense. The State needs the
mental health evidence to rebut the insanity defense, and it seems
logical that raising that defense waives the defendant's right to silence
as to those mental health issues. However, evidence of the crime itself
is a distinct and different question from the issue of mental illness.
Accordingly, the defendant retains the right to assert his Fifth
Amendment privilege as to the details of the crime. Of course, the
defendant could waive his privilege to remain silent as to the details
of the crime, but that waiver would have to be done knowingly and
voluntarily after the administration of Miranda warnings."
Neither Estelle nor Traywicks have been explicitly extended to proceedings for
determining sanity to be executed, but there is little reason to believe that the
[wjhen a defendant asserts the insanity defense and introduces supporting psychiatric
testimony, his silence may deprive the State of the only effective means it has of
controverting his proof on an issue that he interjected into the case. Accordingly, several
Federal Circuit Courts of Appeals have held that, under such circumstances, a defendant
can be required to submit to a sanity examination conducted by the prosecution's
psychiatrist.
Id. 9, 927 P.2d at 1064 (alteration in original) (quoting Estelle v. Smith, 451 U.S. 454, 465 (1981)).
203. 451 U.S. 454 (1981).
204. Id. at 468, 471.
205. Id. at 470-71.
206. 1996 OK CR 54, 927 P.2d 1062.
207. Id. 1 12, 972 P.2d at 1065.
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Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals or the U.S. Supreme Court would adopt a
radically different approach in such cases. However, the finality of the prisoner's
conviction in cases involving sanity to be executed might diminish the pretrial and
trial-level constitutional protections recognized in Estelle and Traywicks. Although
the danger of false or spurious insanity claims is frequently overstated," the
State's interest in avoiding the frustration of its sentencing scheme by a prisoner's
feigned insanity probably justifies the State's right to have its own experts conduct
mental evaluations of the capital prisoner who is allegedly insane.
VII. It's Naught M'Naghten: Prevailing Legal Tests for Insanity to Be Executed
While the Supreme Court prohibited executions of the insane in Ford v.
Wainwright, the case itself failed to articulate any constitutional test for insanity.
Insanity to be executed is not a test of criminal responsibility but rather a question
of the prisoner's present mental state in relation to a capital sentence. Therefore,
the familiar test for insanity in M'Naghten's Case has nothing to do with insanity
to be executed.' In his concurring opinion in Ford, Justice Powell attempted to
correct this omission with his own test. To do so, Justice Powell surveyed various
definitions used at the common law and in state statutes and then formulated a test
208. Despite the lack of empirical support, judges deciding legal questions related to sanity
frequently appeal to what they perceive as the significant dangers presented by feigned or spurious claims
of insanity. In fact, the insanity defense is rarely used at all, and when it is, the data suggest that severe
mental illness is almost always present.
Perhaps the oldest of the insanity defense myths is that criminal defendants who plead
insanity are usually faking, a myth that has bedeviled American jurisprudence since the
mid-nineteenth century. Of the 141 individuals found NGRI [not guilty by reason of
insanity] in one jurisdiction over an eight year period, there was no dispute that 115 were
schizophrenic ... and in only three cases was the diagnostician unwilling or unable to
specify the nature of the patient's mental illness.
Michael L. Perlin, 'The Borderline Which Separated You from Me:" The Insanity Defense, the
Authoritarian Spirit, the Fear of Faking, and the Culture of Punishment, 82 IOWA L. REv. 1375, 1405
(1997).
Professor Perlin attributes such fear of faking to the existence of "sanism," which he defines as "an
irrational prejudice of the same quality and character of other irrational prejudices that cause (and are
reflected in) prevailing social attitudes of racism, sexism, homophobia, and ethnic bigotry." Id. at 1418.
Sanism may affect judicial attitudes in cases involving questions of insanity. Professor Perlin writes,
Sanist attitudes often lead to pretextual decisions. Fact-finders accept, either implicitly or
explicitly, testimonial dishonesty and engage similarly in dishonest, frequently
meretricious, decisionmaking .... Judges often select certain proferred [sic] data that
adheres to their pre-existing social and political attitudes, and use heuristic reasoning...
to rationalize otherwise baseless judicial decisions.
Id. at 1419. The possibility that decision makers in these cases may hold sanist attitudes should be taken
into account when formulating a strategy for the presentation of evidence. Where possible, defense
counsel should retain more than one expert and require separate evaluations of the defendant's mental
condition. In a following section, this article explains how we, Van Woudenberg's attorneys, followed
this approach and used separate evaluations in preparing for the sanity trial in the Van Woudenberg case.
209. Oklahoma has long followed the definition of insanity articulated by the House of Lords in
M'Naghten's Case, 8 Eng. Rep. 718 (1843), as the test for criminal responsibility. See Pugh v. State,
1989 OK CR 70, 781 P.2d 843.
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of his own. The resulting combination of judicial hubris and oversimplification is
properly considered the "sound bite" test for insanity: "[T]he Eighth Amendment
forbids the execution only of those who are unaware of the punishment they are
about to suffer and why they are to suffer it."2 '
By focusing solely on the prisoner's awareness of the punishment and the
reasons for it, Justice Powell espoused a cognitive test that rests the determination
of insanity solely on the prisoner's mental awareness of the sentence. Justice
Powell's definition omitted any functional element of insanity as it was defined at
the common law, which required the court to determine whether the prisoner had
sufficient present understanding and intelligence to assist in his defense or
articulate any reason why his punishment would be unjust or unlawful."' Justice
Powell found that the common law justifications for this functional inquiry were
out of step with the elaborate systems of judicial review required by modern
capital punishment law."' He reasoned that "modern practice provides far more
extensive review of convictions and sentences than did the common law," such as
direct appeal and collateral review."' Based on these modern practices and
guarantees of effective assistance of counsel, he reasoned that "[iut is thus unlikely
indeed that a defendant today could go to his death with knowledge of undis-
covered trial error that might set him free.'' Justice Powell further reasoned that
the modern law's requirement that a defendant be competent to stand trial ensured
that the defendant would be able to assist in his defense."
The absence of the functional inquiry required by the common law is a serious
flaw in Justice Powell's formulation of a test for insanity to be executed. Judicial
scrutiny of capital convictions and sentences is indeed more rigorous than it was
at the common law, but the prisoner's need to meaningfully participate in the
judicial and executive processes that may lead to his execution is entitled to more
careful consideration than that given by Justice Powell. The Supreme Court has
emphasized the significance of executive clemency in modern capital-sentencing
schemes, stating that "[e]xecutive clemency has provided the 'fail-safe' in our
criminal justice system."2 '6 The Supreme Court has acknowledged that questions
210. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring).
211. Common law writers such as Hale and Blackstone spoke of insanity in terms of a functional
inability on the part of the prisoner to allege something that might render his punishment unlawful or
unjust. See 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at *24-*25 ("[l]f, after judgment, he becomes of nonsane
memory, execution shall be stayed: for peradventure, says the humanity of the English law, had the
prisoner been of sound memory, he might have alleged something in stay of judgment or execution.");
HALE, supra note 57, at 35 ("[11f after judgment he become of rum sane memory, his execution shall be
spared; for were he of sound memory he might allege somewhat in stay of judgment or execution.").
Because either "idiocy" or "lunacy" might render a person "insane" under this test, the concept of insanity
at common law was broad enough to include both mental illness such as schizophrenia and mental defect
such as mental retardation, organic brain damage, or other forms of dementia.
212. Ford, 477 U.S. at 420 (Powell, J., concurring).
213. Id.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 420-21 (Powell, J., concurring).
216. Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390. 415 (1993) (quoting KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS:
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of innocence and the larger questions of the justness of a particular capital
sentence have historically been, and will continue to be, presented to chief
executives and clemency boards in the states:
It is an unalterable fact that our judicial system, like the human beings
who administer it, is fallible. But history is replete with examples of
wrongfully convicted persons who have been pardoned in the wake of
after-discovered evidence establishing their innocence. In his classic
work, Professor Edwin Borchard compiled 65 cases in which it was
later determined that individuals had been wrongfully convicted of
crimes. Clemency provided the relief mechanism in 47 of these cases;
the remaining cases ended in judgments of acquittals after new trials.
Recent authority confirms that over the past century clemency has been
exercised frequently in capital cases in which demonstrations of "actual
innocence" have been made.' 7
The Supreme Court's acknowledgment of the fallibility of the American system
of capital punishment suggests that Justice Powell's confident assertions about the
reliability of judicial review are naive and irresponsible. Dispensing with any
inquiry into the condemned prisoner's ability to assist in his own defense or to
articulate a reason why he should not be executed is inconsistent with the Supreme
Court's own statements about the critical role played by executive clemency in the
overall fairness of a capital-punishment scheme.
When all legal appeals have failed and the sentence of death is beyond collateral
attack, the prisoner's functional ability to participate in clemency proceedings -
by proclaiming his innocence, expressing his heartfelt remorse, or pleading for his
life by arguing his lesser culpability in the capital crime - might mean the
difference between living and dying. Justice Powell's disregard of this functional
capacity as a necessary part of the sanity inquiry is unsound in theory and
unjustified in practice. If clemency is indeed the "fail-safe" of capital justice, then
a test for sanity to be executed that ignores the prisoner's functional inability to
participate in that process encourages the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishment.
Largely in response to Ford, in 1987, the American Bar Association included
the following test for insanity to be executed (also known as incompetence to be
executed) in the ABA Criminal Justice Mental Health Standards:
A convict is incompetent to be executed if, as a result of mental illness
or mental retardation, the convict cannot understand the nature of the
pending proceedings, what he or she was tried for, the reason for the
punishment, or the nature of the punishment. A convict is also incom-
petent if, as a result of mental illness or mental retardation, the convict
JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 131 (1989)).
217. Id. (citing EDWIN BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT (1932); MICHAEL L. RADELET ET
AL., IN SPITE OF INNOCENCE 282-356 (1992)).
[Vol. 55:1
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol55/iss1/2
INSANITY, EXECUTIONS & CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
lacks sufficient capacity to recognize or understand any fact which
might exist which would make the punishment unjust or unlawful, or
lacks the ability to convey such information to counsel or to the
court."'
The language of the ABA standard is largely adopted from Justice Frankfurter's
dissenting opinion in Solesbee v. Balkcom.21 Unlike Justice Powell's definition,
the ABA definition expressly contemplates incompetence resulting from either
mental illness or mental retardation.2" Competence according to this standard
also requires an assessment of the prisoner's awareness of both prior and pending
proceedings. Thus the standard seems to appreciate the prisoner's need to
understand what he was tried for and why he is being punished. Since the test
requires a further assessment of the prisoner's understanding of the "nature of the
punishment,"" ' a prisoner is incompetent if his mental defect or disease prevents
an understanding of the finality of punishment as an end to natural life. Under this
standard, prisoners who are aware of their trial, conviction, and sentence, but who
suffer from delusions or lack of understanding about the reality of death itself
should not be executed.
Justice Powell's test arguably incorporates these cognitive inquiries somewhere
within the vague parameters of prisoners being "unaware of the punishment they
are about to suffer and why they are to suffer it.".m However, the ABA standard
is far more exacting than Powell's definition in its fidelity to the functional element
of sanity required at the common law. The prisoner's execution must be stayed if
the prisoner lacks sufficient capacity to recognize or understand any fact that
would make the punishment either unjust or unlawful, or lacks the ability to
communicate such information to counsel or the court.'
If a prisoner's understanding of the reason he was sentenced to death is wholly
delusional or nonexistent, he obviously cannot rationally communicate important
matters that might call the justness of the sentence into question. Such matters
include expressions of remorse, his relatively limited participation in the offense,
mitigating evidence in his own background, or other information that mitigates,
exculpates, or justifies the extension of mercy by the chief executive. The ABA
Commentary to Standard 7-5.6 contrasts its formulation of incompetence to the
definition adopted by Justice Powell:
The Standard reflects a different viewpoint. This parallels the Stan-
dards' two-pronged test for incompetence to stand trial, addressing both
ability to understand the proceedings and ability to assist counsel. The
possibility that a defendant could be executed because of inability to
218. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, Standard 7-5.6(b) (1987).
219. Id. cmt. (citing Solesbee v. Balkcom, 339 U.S. 9, 20 n.3 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
220. Id. Standard 7-5.6.
221. Id.
222. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 422 (1986).
223. ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS, Standard 7-5.6(b) (1987).
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communicate information that could be relevant to the decision
whether to carry out the death sentence is equally unacceptable as
executing someone who could not understand the penalty. (It need not,
of course, be information that would "set him free" to be relevant.)'
Perhaps surprisingly, Oklahoma's legal test for insanity to be executed reflects
a humane concern that the capital prisoner possess two traits: (I) a cognitive
understanding of the nature of the proceedings against him and the true nature of
the punishment; and (2) a present functional ability to rationally participate in the
proceedings affecting his fate. The governing test in Oklahoma for insanity to be
executed is found in Bingham v. State:
The test of the question as to whether one about to be executed is sane
or insane is whether or not such person, at the time of the examination,
from the defects of his faculties, has sufficient intelligence to
understand the nature of the proceedings against him, what he was
tried for, the purpose of his punishment, the impending fate which
awaits him, and a sufficient understanding to know any fact which
might exist which would make his punishment unjust or unlawful, and
the intelligence requisite to convey such information to his attorneys
or the court. If he has, then he is sane; otherwise he is insane, and
should not be executed."
The Bingham test mirrors the requirements of the ABA standard in important
ways, emphasizing that the prisoner's insanity might arise from any one or a
combination of "defects of his faculties," including mental illness, mental
retardation, or other organic dysfunction of the brain.27 The test requires certain
cognitive abilities, i.e., "sufficient intelligence to understand" the charge for which
he was tried and the reason he is being punished.'" Its reference to the prisoner's
understanding of the "impending fate which awaits him" further requires a rational
appreciation for the finality of death.' Bingham requires the court to suspend
the execution in the absence of certain functional abilities, including the ability to
know any fact affecting either the justness or legality of the sentence and the
ability to convey that information to attorneys or the court.' The fact need not
necessarily amount to legal error, as Justice Powell would apparently have it;
rather, any fact that mitigates the offense or warrants the extension of mercy to the
offender is sufficient. Although any legal test can be subject to judicial
manipulation and pretextuality, in theory, the Bingham test sets a higher legal
standard and protects the integrity of otherwise lawful executions. In so doing,
224. Id. Standard 7-5.6 cmt. n.7 (citation omitted).
225. 1946 OK CR ., 169 P.2d 311.
226. Id. 1 __, 169 P.2d at 314-15.
227. Id. 1. __, 169 P.2d at 314.
228. Id.
229. Id.
230. Id. 1. ., 169 P.2d at 314-15.
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Bingham remains faithful to what Blackstone called "the humanity of English law,"
which is the lifeblood of the constitutional prohibition against executions of the
insane."'
VIII. When Is Voluntary Not Voluntary? Antipsychotic Medication
and Sanity to Be Executed
The State's ability to medicate a capital prisoner who has been adjudicated
insane raises fundamental philosophical and constitutional questions. Satisfactory
solutions to the virtually intractable dilemmas caused by the State's medication of
insane, death-sentenced prisoners are beyond the scope of this article. However,
it is necessary to discuss the constitutional authorities that may limit the State's
authority to dispense medication to an insane prisoner in order to restore his sanity
for execution.
For purposes of this discussion, I will assume that the prisoner has already been
adjudicated insane and that his insanity is the probable result of a treatable mental
illness. The competence of prisoners with a permanently disabling mental
condition, such as mental retardation or brain damage from a stroke or organic
syndrome, probably cannot be restored with medication. The more difficult cases,
which this section of the article discusses, are those of prisoners suffering from a
psychotic thought disorder such as schizophrenia, which sometimes can be treated
with antipsychotic drugs.
Formulating legal objections to the State's medication of an insane capital
prisoner will often require the lawyer to confront a factually ambiguous situation.
Generally, if a prisoner has an illness, the Eighth Amendment (and most state
constitutions) require prison authorities to provide an appropriate diagnosis and
treatment of his condition.2 This general rule becomes extremely complicated
in application to an insane capital prisoner. While the prison official is bound by
law to provide medical treatment to the prisoner, the legal consequence of
successful treatment of the prisoner's mental illness may be his eventual execution.
The legal situation is further complicated by the issue of whether the prisoner's
treatment with antipsychotic medications by prison physicians is "voluntary" or
"involuntary" as a matter of constitutional law. Even when prison officials do not
use physical force to medicate the inmate, his compliant ingestion of prescribed
medication may not be based on "informed consent." The prior adjudication of the
prisoner's insanity stands as positive proof that the prisoner cannot fully
comprehend his legal situation, and the medication itself may further blunt the
prisoner's ability to choose his course of treatment with due consideration of the
legal consequences. This adds to the difficulty of deciding whether a prisoner's
ingestion of prescribed medication is voluntary or involuntary in a constitutional
sense.
231. 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 56, at *24.
232. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976) (holding that the Eighth Amendment protects
prisoners from state officials' deliberate indifference to a serious medical need).
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Despite its potential factual ambiguity, the voluntary or involuntary nature of the
State's medication of the insane prisoner has constitutional significance in two
different contexts. First, it is significant to the question of whether the insane
'prisoner has a constitutional right to object to unwanted medication when he is
required to appear and participate in judicial proceedings to determine whether his
sanity has been restored. Second, it is significant to the substantive question of
whether the U.S. Constitution prohibits the unwanted medication of a capital
prisoner where the purpose (or collateral but probable effect) of such medication
is to bring about a restoration of sanity and thus eventual execution. I will address
these two questions in turn, providing an overview of the relevant Supreme Court
cases that will almost certainly inform future litigation in this area.
A. The Right to Refuse Antipsychotic Medication During Sanity-Determination
Proceedings
In Riggins v. Nevada, 3 the Supreme Court held that the State's administration
of the antipsychotic medication Mellaril to the petitioner throughout his trial, over
his objection, violated the Fourteenth Amendment. 4 Riggins had been charged
with robbery and capital murder. In jail, he told a physician that he was hearing
voices in his head and having trouble sleeping. The doctor prescribed a regimen
of the antipsychotic drug Mellaril, gradually increasing the dosage to 800
milligrams daily. Although defense counsel raised the question of Riggins'
competency, the court found Riggins competent and ordered him to stand trial for
murder."'
Before trial, defense counsel filed a motion to suspend the administration of
Mellaril to Riggins during the trial, arguing that continued administration of the
drug against Riggins' wishes infringed his rights under the Fourteenth Amendment
and Nevada's constitution.' In support of this argument, defense counsel pointed
out that the serious side effects of antipsychotic drugs were unwanted, and that the
drug would affect Riggins' demeanor and mental state during the trial."7 Because
defense counsel intended to offer insanity as a defense to the murder charge, he
also argued that the Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed Riggins the right to show
jurors his "true mental state."23
At the hearing on Riggins' motion, psychiatrists had different opinions regarding
the precise effect of suspending Riggins' medication. The treating physician
testified that Riggins would be competent to stand trial without medication and that
jurors would probably notice the effects of Mellaril on his demeanor. Another
physician testified that the medication would calm Riggins, but that high doses
could cause drowsiness. Yet another physician testified that he could not predict
233. 504 U.S. 127 (1992).
234. Id. at 138.
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Riggins' behavior if medication were suspended. The trial court also considered
a report by another physician predicting that if the medication were suspended,
Riggins would lapse into a manifest psychosis and become difficult to manage."9
The trial court denied Riggins' motion.' At trial, Riggins pled insanity and
testified in his own defense about the events resulting in the homicide. u ' The
jury convicted Riggins and sentenced him to death."2 On appeal to the Nevada
Supreme Court, Riggins again argued that the unwanted administration of Mellaril
throughout the trial denied his right to assist in his own defense and prejudicially
affected his attitude, appearance, and demeanor before the jury. 3 Riggins argued
that the Fourteenth Amendment includes a freedom from unwanted administration
of such drugs, which can be overcome only by a showing that less restrictive
alternatives will not adequately protect the State's legitimate interest in restoring
him to competence and bringing him to trial. ' Thus, Riggins argued, the trial
court's failure to consider the use of less restrictive alternatives to involuntary
antipsychotic medication, such as sedatives or tranquilizers, violated this
Fourteenth Amendment right.us
The Nevada Supreme Court affirmed the conviction and death sentence.' On
writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed. u7 The Supreme Court agreed with
Riggins that continued use of antipsychotic medication over his objection was
constitutional error and that prejudice resulting from such error would be
presumed.'" The Court relied heavily on its 1990 opinion in Washington v.
Harper,'9 discussed fully later in this section, and held:
Under Harper, forcing antipsychotic drugs on a convicted prisoner is
impermissible absent a finding of overriding justification and a deter-
mination of medical appropriateness. The Fourteenth Amendment
affords at least as much protection to persons the State detains for trial.
Thus, once Riggins moved to terminate administration of antipsychotic
medication, the State became obligated to establish the need for
Mellaril and the medical appropriateness of the drug.'
While presuming "that administration of Mellaril was medically appropriate,""'
the Supreme Court held that continued administration of the drugs throughout





244. Id. at 131-32.
245. Id.
246. Id. at 132.
247. Id. at 138.
248. Id. at 137-38.
249. 494 U.S. 210 (1990).
250. Riggins, 504 U.S. at 135 (citations omitted).
251. Id. at 133.
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Riggins' trial was not justified by any state interest appearing from the record."2
The Court further reasoned that the drugs had significantly interfered with Riggins'
liberty interest under the Fourteenth Amendment to be free from administration of
medication against his will.2" The Court also presumed that such involuntary
administration of antipsychotic drugs in a criminal trial resulted in prejudice to
Riggins and denied him a fair trial. '
The Supreme Court was careful to note that "the record in this case narrowly
defines the issues before us." 5 How, then, does Riggins potentially apply to the
situation of a capital prisoner who objects to further medication during proceedings
to determine whether he has been restored to sanity?
Because of the Supreme Court's conscious attempt to limit the holding in Riggins,
it may initially appear that the case provides little support for the argument that
capital prisoners have a similar constitutional right to refuse unwanted antipsychotic
medication during proceedings to determine present sanity to be executed. However,
the Supreme Court's holding in Riggins was an extension of the rule established in
Washington v. Harper, which involved prisoners. Therefore, applying the liberty
interest recognized in Riggins to proceedings involving convicted prisoners involves
no quantum leap from constitutional criminal-trial procedure into the realm of
prisoners' rights. On the contrary, the Supreme Court's prior recognition of the
freedom from unwanted medication belonging to convicted prisoners in Harper
dictated the result for the situation involving pretrial detainees in Riggins.
252. Id. at 137-38.
253. id.
254. Id. The Court held:
Efforts to prove or disprove actual prejudice from the record before us would be futile,
and guesses whether the outcome of the trial might have been different if Riggins' motion
had been granted would be purely speculative. We accordingly reject the dissent's
suggestion that Riggins should be required to demonstrate how the trial would have
proceeded differently if he had not been given Mellaril. Like the consequences of
compelling a defendant to wear prison clothing, or of binding and gagging an accused
during trial, the precise consequences of forcing antipsychotic medication upon Riggins
cannot be shown from a trial transcript. What the testimony of doctors who examined
Riggins establishes, and what we will not ignore, is a strong possibility that Riggins'
defense was impaired due to the administration of Mellaril.
... [Alllowing Riggins to present expert testimony about the effect of Mellaril on his
demeanor did nothing to cure the possibility that the substance of his own testimony, his
interaction with counsel, or his comprehension at trial were compromised by forced ad-
ministration of Mellaril. Even if (as the dissent argues) the Nevada Supreme Court was
right that expert testimony allowed jurors to assess Riggins' demeanor fairly, an
unacceptable risk of prejudice remained.
... [Tlrial prejudice can sometimes be justified by an essential state interest. Because
the record contains no finding that might support a conclusion that administration of
antipsychotic medication was necessary to accomplish an essential state policy, however,
we have no basis for saying that the substantial probability of trial prejudice in this case
was justified.
Id. (citations omitted).
255. Id. at 133.
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Riggins and Harper therefore suggest that capital prisoners could legitimately
object to receiving further medication while subject to judicial proceedings to
determine their sanity to be executed. Part of Riggins' claim was that the Fourteenth
Amendment protected his right to show the jury his "true mental state."' And in
Ford v. Wainwright, when the Supreme Court discussed the kind of procedural
reliability it would henceforth demand in state sanity determinations, it cautioned that
"[i]t is all the more important that the adversary presentation of relevant information
be as unrestricted as possible" and that "any procedure that precludes the prisoner or
his counsel from presenting material relevant to his sanity or bars consideration of
that material by the factfinder is necessarily inadequate." 7
Medication of the prisoner with antipsychotic drugs that (1) prevent the un-
restricted presentation of relevant evidence of insanity (including testimony by, or
proper evaluation of, the prisoner), or (2) bar the finder of fact (jury or judge) from
considering relevant evidence would render the state's sanity-determination procedure
"inadequate" under Ford. Therefore, absent an overriding justification shown by the
State, the administration of antipsychotic medications over the prisoner's objection
would violate both the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments. Such an overriding
justification would require the State to prove more than the appropriateness of the
medication to the prisoner's illness. A strong showing that the prisoner is uncontrol-
lable or predictably violent while in an unmedicated state might be adequate to justify
continued forced medication. In most cases, this will be a difficult standard for the
State to meet. If the prisoner objects, the court should ordinarily suspend the
medication throughout the course of sanity-determination proceedings.
B. Treating to Kill: Forcing Antipsychotic Drugs on the Insane Prisoner
Beyond the procedural confines of sanity-determination proceedings lies the more
substantive question: Can the State medicate a prisoner with antipsychotic (or other)
drugs when the purpose (or collateral but probable effect) of such medication is
restoration of the prisoner's sanity to be executed? Is it the State's intent, or just the
probable (but perhaps unintended) consequence of medication, that is relevant to the
constitutional question? Perhaps no issue of recent times evokes more fundamental
tension in the proper relationship between the government and the individual. Forced
medication carries with it connotations of invasive mind control by the State. When
the objectives of the treatment include preparing the patient for capital punishment,
the conflict between the State's duty to relieve the prisoner's suffering and the State's
(often equally zealous) endeavor to hasten his destruction is one of the most
unsettling paradoxes at the intersection of law and medical science.'
256. Id. at 130.
257. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 414-17 (1986).
258. See. e.g., Bruce A. Arrigo & Jeffery J. Tasca, Right to Refuse Treatment, Competency to Be
Executed, and Therapeutic Jurisprudence: Toward a Systematic Analysis, 23 LAW AND PSYCHOL. REV.
1, 44-46 (1999). The authors identify at least four "anti-therapeutic" effects of a state policy allowing
forced medication of the condemned. First, the "use of therapists as an adjunct to the administration of
capital punishment bastardizes their role as healers." Id. Second,
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Beyond these observations, this discussion is limited to the few published cases
that have directly addressed the forced medication of prisoners facing capital
punishment. Two state supreme courts - Louisiana and South Carolina - have
rejected forced medication on constitutional grounds. A third - the Supreme Court
of Arkansas - seems to have embraced the practice of forced medication based on
a determination of the State's intent in giving the medication.
In State v. Perry,"9 the Louisiana trial court adjudicated the prisoner insane to
be executed but found that sanity could be restored through the administration of
antipsychotic medication. ' The trial court committed the prisoner and ordered drug
treatment, even against the prisoner's will if necessary."' The Louisiana Supreme
Court reversed, specifically holding that, under its state constitutional right to privacy
and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments, the State could not
medicate an incompetent defendant in order to carry out his death sentence.' The
court found that forced medication is just a way around the constitutional prohibition
against executing the insane:
For centuries no jurisdiction has approved the execution of the insane.
The state's attempt to circumvent this well-settled prohibition by forcibly
medicating an insane prisoner with antipsychotic drugs violates his rights
under our state constitution. First, it violates his right to privacy or
personhood. Such involuntary medication requires the unjustified
invasion of his brain and body with discomforting, potentially dangerous
and painful drugs, the seizure of control of his mind and thoughts, and
the usurpation of his right to make decisions regarding his health or
medical treatment. Furthermore, implementation of the state's plan to
medicate forcibly and execute the insane prisoner would constitute cruel,
excessive and unusual punishment.'
to ask a psychiatrist to treat an incompetent death row inmate so that a capital punishment
sentence can be metted (sic] out has profound emotional consequence for the physician
performing the treatment. The psychiatrist must live with the fact that he or she has
treated a prisoner so that the inmate could be legally executed.
Id. at 45. Third, the policy of "deputizing clinicians to assist penal executioners arguably breeds distrust
between physicians and inmates and between physicians and the general population," thereby
compromising the trust and confidence that "are essential prerequisites to beneficial medical treatment."
Id. Lastly, "[plrisoners facing execution upon successful treatment may be motivated to resist and
frustrate the intervention," while health care professionals who restore competency with forced drugs
"would confront the sobering reality of how they facilitated a prisoner's execution." Id. at 46.
259. 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992).
260. Id. at 747.
261. Id.
262. Id.
263. Id. (citation omitted). The court went on to state:
This particular application of the death penalty fails to measurably contribute to the social
goals of capital punishment. Carrying out this punitive scheme would add severity and
indignity to the prisoner's punishment beyond that required for the mere extinguishment
of life. This type of punitive treatment system is not accepted anywhere in contemporary
society and is apt to be administered erroneously, arbitrarily or capriciously.
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The Perry decision rested largely on the Louisiana Supreme Court's conclusion that
the State's involuntary treatment of Perry was solely intended to render him
competent for execution. This raises the factual problem of whether medication with
an ambiguous purpose or effect is constitutionally permissible. Can the State argue
that its primary duty is to treat the prisoner's mental illness, regardless of the possible
consequence of restored competency, and thereby avoid a constitutional rule that
prohibits medication solely to restore competency? Although Washington v. Harper
seems to allow forced medication when it is "medically appropriate" and ac-
complishes an important state interest,' the Perry court found that treatment of
incompetent capital prisoners who would be executed if competency is restored is not
medical "treatment" at all. Instead, the court found this type of treatment "antithetical
to the basic principles of the healing arts."' According to this view, as long as the
State actively pursues the prisoner's execution, the provision of psychiatric treatment
does not benefit the prisoner but rather serves the State's interest in enforcing its
death-penalty law. Treatment of a prisoner under sentence of death is then properly
characterized as aiding the executioner, not the inmate, and is therefore un-
constitutional.
The South Carolina Supreme Court followed the reasoning of Perry in Singleton
v. State.' The death-sentenced prisoner in Singleton was found incompetent by the
judge in a post-conviction hearing.' The trial court then modified the death
sentence to life imprisonment and the State appealed.' Among others, the South
Carolina Supreme Court decided the issue of whether the State could forcibly
medicate the prisoner to restore his competency. Relying heavily on the right to
privacy guaranteed by the state constitution' and the due process analysis in
Washington v. Harper, the South Carolina Supreme Court also prohibited forced
medication of the prisoner solely to facilitate his execution.'
The court in Singleton assumed that the State had a substantial interest in
medicating the symptoms of a violent, mentally ill prisoner. But it rejected the
id. at 747-48.
264. 494 U.S. 210, 211 (1990).
265. Perry, 610 So. 2d at 751.
266. 437 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1993).
267. Id. at 55.
268. Id.
269. The South Carolina Constitution provides in part, "The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures and unreasonable
invasions of privacy shall not be violated." S.C. CONST. art. 1, § 10.
270. Singleton, 437 S.E.2d at 61. In so holding, the court reasoned:
We hold that the South Carolina Constitutional right of privacy would be violated if
the State were to sanction forced medication solely to facilitate execution. An inmate in
South Carolina has a very limited privacy interest when weighed against the State's
penological interest; however, the inmate must be free from unwarranted medical
intrusions. Federal due process and our own South Carolina Constitution require that an
inmate can only receive forced medication where the inmate is dangerous to himself or
to others, and then only when it is in the inmate's best medical interest.
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argument that medicating the prisoner to facilitate his execution could ever meet
Harper's requirement that forced medication be in the prisoner's "medical
interest.' 7 Like the Louisiana Supreme Court, the South Carolina Supreme Court
essentially rejected the notion of the State's use of drugs as "treatment" in the medical
sense."' The court reasoned that both the Hippocratic Oath27 and the established
ethical principles of the medical profession recognize the essential difference between
the use of drugs to effect death and the use of drugs as a form of medical treatment.
The American Medical Society and the American Psychiatric
Associations have adopted positions in their respective ethical codes
opposing participation by medical professionals in the legally-authorized
execution of a prisoner. Their reasoning is the causal relationship
between administering a drug which allows the inmate to be executed,
and the execution itself. They opine that the administration of the drug
is responsible for the inmate's ultimate death. 4
The South Carolina Supreme Court stated a final reason for its conclusion that
forced medication would not be in Singleton's medical interest.2" The evidence
presented in the trial court established that Singleton suffered from both
schizophrenia and organic brain damage. Singleton's brain damage made it unlikely
that forced medication would render him competent to be executed and the organic
brain damage made him more vulnerable to the painful side effects of antipsychotic
medications." These additional facts further convinced the court that forced
administration of antipsychotic drugs was not in Singleton's medical interest.7
Therefore, the State failed to satisfy both the due process requirements of Washington
v. Harper and the privacy interests protected by the South Carolina Constitution. 7
Not unlike Perry, Singleton dealt with the direct question of forced medication
intended solely to facilitate the prisoner's execution. Thus, both cases imply the
possibility of a different result where the forced administration of medication has the
271. Id. at 60-61.
272. Id. at 61.
273. As quoted by the South Carolina Supreme Court, the Hippocratic Oath provides:
I Swear by Apollo the physician, by Aesculapius, Hygeia, and Panacea, and I take to
witness all the gods, all the goddesses, to keep according to my ability and my judgment
the following Oath: ... I will prescribe regimen for the good of my patients according
to my ability and my judgment and never do harm to anyone. To please no one will I
prescribe a deadly drug, nor give advice which may cause his death .... I will preserve
the purity of my life and my art .... In every house where I come I will enter only for
the good of my patients, keeping myself far from all intentional ill doing ....
Id. (quoting State v. Perry, 610 So. 2d 746, 752 (La. 1992)).
274. Id. (citing AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, THE PRINCIPLES OF MEDICAL ETHICS: WITH ANNOTATIONS
ESPECIALLY APPLICABLE TO PSYCHIATRY § 1(4) (1985); Donald H. Wallace, Incompetency for Execution,
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incidental effect of rendering the prisoner competent for execution. Predictably, the
distinction has not gone unnoticed. Because the State may easily deny that it intends
to render the prisoner competent, government attorneys eventually recast the issue as
one of unintended consequences rather than a lethal experiment in modem chemistry.
A court would eventually find itself in agreement with this unctuous premise. It
happened in Arkansas in the case of Singleton v. Norris.2"
In Singleton v. Norris, the capital prisoner had been treated with antipsychotic
medications for years in prison. In 1997, he voluntarily ceased taking his medications
and lapsed into psychosis. On the recommendation of his psychiatrist, a Medication
Review Panel authorized the forced administration of antipsychotic drugs. While
under this forced regimen, the prisoner lost his last appeals and an execution date
was set. He petitioned the trial court for declaratory relief prohibiting his execution
while his competency was maintained through the involuntary administration of
drugs. ' The trial court denied relief and he appealed."'
Before the Arkansas Supreme Court, the parties stipulated that the prisoner was
presently competent to be executed, but the prisoner argued that his execution would
be unconstitutional as it was procured through the forced administration of antip-
sychotic drugs. "2 ' The State responded that it had a duty to medicate the prisoner
so long as he remained a danger to himself or others, and the fact that he became
competent under such medication was merely an unintended effect."' The State
thus denied that it was medicating the prisoner solely to facilitate his execution. The
Arkansas Supreme Court agreed.
The court held that forced medication of the prisoner was appropriate due to the
State's "due process obligation to provide appropriate medical care to persons in its
custody."' It reasoned that, under Washington v. Harper, forced medication was
"for appellant's own good and for the security of the institution in which he is incar-
cerated; it remains appropriate as long as appellant is alive and is either a potential
danger to himself or others.""5 In what may be an example of Michael Perlin's
theory of pretextuality, the court ignored the lethal effect of the forced medication so
long as the State portrayed its action as one for the benefit of the prisoner: "Here,
the State contends that the medication is necessary for appellant's own good and for
the safety of others. The intent of the State was not to medicate him in order to
make him competent to be executed."'
The Court expressed particular concern that "appellant has not contested the
appropriateness of the involuntary administration of medication under Washington v.
279. 992 S.W.2d 768 (Ark. 1999). The capital prisoner in Arkansas is no apparent relation to the
more fortunate prisoner in Singleton v. State.
280. Id. at 768.
281. Id. at 769.
282. Id.
283. Id. at 770.
284. Id. at 769.
285. Id.
286. Id. at 770.
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Harper.""' In fact, that same sentence, verbatim, appears twice in the short
opinion:
As appellant has neither contested Washington v. Harper nor taken an
appeal from same, we hold that the State had a burden to medicate
appellant under Harper, that said burden continues, and that the State has
met and is meeting its burden. We further hold that because appellant
never requested a Ford hearing while off the medication, Washington v.
Harper is controlling, and the collateral effect of the involuntary
medication rendering him competent to understand the nature and reason
for his execution is therefore no violation of any due process law.
Of course, the Arkansas Supreme Court doth protest too much that the prisoner
never "contested the appropriateness" of his medication. The opinion itself gives this
away:
[The prisoner] assert[ed] that to the extent the involuntary administration
of medication might have been appropriate when it was originally
ordered in August of 1997, following a Harper evaluation conducted by
the Medication Review Panel, such administration ceased to be valid as
a medical necessity for appellant's own good when his stay of execution
was dissolved and an execution date was proclaimed.'
Contrary to the Arkansas Supreme Court's dismissive portrayal, Singleton's
argument was more than a flailing attempt to bring his case within Harper's
limitations on forced medication; it went to the very heart of the matter. "Medical
appropriateness" was the point at which the courts in Perry and Singleton drew the
constitutional line. Forced medication may be "medically appropriate" where the
prisoner is mentally ill and a danger to himself or others, but when it brings about
the prisoner's execution, it cannot be described sensibly as state action that is in
the prisoner's medical interest. Under Perry and Singleton v. State, the only
apparent way to avoid this constitutional conflict is to vacate the death sentence
and impose a noncapital sentence before allowing any forced medication of the
prisoner.
After the Arkansas Supreme Court rejected Singleton's challenge to forced
medication, Singleton filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus in federal district
court. Singleton argued that his execution would violate Ford v. Wainwright, not
because he was presently incompetent, but rather because his competency was
achieved by involuntary medication.' The district court reached the same
conclusion as the Arkansas Supreme Court, reasoning that "current law only
prohibits medicating an incompetent death row inmate when the sole purpose is to
287. id.
288. id.
289. Id. at 769.
290. Singleton v. Norris, 267 F.3d 859, 861 (8th Cir. 2002), rehearing en banc granted and
judgment vacated, No. 00-1492, 2001 U.S. App. LEXIS 26097 (8th Cir. Dec. 5, 2001) (unpublished).
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make him competent so that the State can execute him.""' The district court
concluded that there was "no evidence ... that the actions and decisions of the
medical personnel involved were in any degree motivated by the desire, purpose
or intent to make Mr. Singleton competent so that he could be executed."'
Based on these findings, the district court denied Singleton's habeas petition and
his request for a stay of execution.
Singleton's fortunes briefly turned when he appealed the district court's ruling
to the court of appeals and renewed his request for a stay of execution. A three-
judge panel of the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the order of the
district court and granted a "permanent" stay of execution, which effectively
modified Singleton's sentence to life imprisonment. After discussing both Ford and
Harper, the court of appeals reasoned that "neither case answers the question of
whether a state can involuntarily medicate an otherwise incompetent prisoner to
protect him from harming himself or others and then execute the prisoner if the
medication renders him Ford competent." '
Questioning whether the constitutional analysis in Harper could be applied in
cases of forcible medication of death row prisoners who were facing execution,
the court of appeals believed that if the State's intent controlled the question of
constitutionality in such cases, then "the State can be expected to claim that it is
medicating the inmate to protect him from harming himself and others, and the
prisoner will almost certainly argue the State's proffered reasons are a pretext for
rendering him competent to be executed."'
The court of appeals ultimately decided that the State's intent in medicating the
inmate was not dispositive. Instead, relying on the "unique" facts, primarily the
inmate's longstanding mental illness and his frequent psychotic episodes even while
medicated, the court concluded that
there is no way of knowing how long he will remain competent once
the medication is discontinued or how long it will take him to regain
Ford competency once he begins taking medication.
... Singleton does not have the understanding necessary to permit
the State to execute him. It is therefore time to bring this case to an
end and grant a permanent stay of execution. To do otherwise in the
circumstances of this case would, in the words of Justice Marshall,
subject Singleton to "the barbarity of exacting mindless vengeance.""
However, the court greatly exaggerated the permanence of Singleton's stay of
execution. Within two months of the panel opinion granting the stay, the court of
appeals granted rehearing en banc and vacated the opinion of the three-judge panel
291. Id. at 864 (quoting transcript of 2/16/00 District Court Hearing, at 94-95).
292. Id.
293. Id. at 869.
294. Id.
295. Id. at 871 (quoting Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. at 399, 410 (1986)).
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in an unpublished order. The en banc court recently heard oral arguments in the
case, but has yet to issue an order affirming the judgment of the district court.'
Singleton v. Norris reveals important shortcomings of Washington v. Harper as
it applies to the question of forced medication in capital cases. The inmate in
Harper was not exposed to the death penalty as a result (unintended or otherwise)
of the forced medication sanctioned in that opinion. The extremely delicate balance
struck in that case recognized that the invasion of the inmate's bodily integrity was
not so extreme, in light of the need to maintain the prisoner's long-term health and
institutional safety, that it violated substantive due process.
As a matter of candor and common sense, the long-term health (or "medical
interest") of the insane capital prisoner is not the concern of the State that seeks
to forcibly medicate him. This fact alone skews the Harper analysis to an
unworkable degree. Applying the Harper analysis to capital prisoners facing forced
medication and possibly execution invites prosecutors and courts to engage in
disingenuous assessments of governmental intent and pretextual appraisals of
"medical interest." Harper's due process protection against involuntary medication
is dubious indeed if the State's performance of its "due process obligation" to
provide medical care becomes a license to "unintentionally" medicate its prisoner
right into the execution chamber.
These concerns bring the article back to the case of Sammy Van Woudenberg.
A psychologist who evaluated Van Woudenberg in 1994 poignantly described him
as a person who "was born into a world of poverty and pain and it never
ended." A life of emotional deprivation, family dislocation, poverty, abuse,
drugs, and prison took a heavy toll. Since his early childhood, Van Woudenberg
had been diagnosed with mental retardation and organic brain syndrome. Later
diagnoses revealed a psychotic thought disorder, later termed schizophrenia of an
undifferentiated type. 8
After a jury declared Van Woudenberg insane in 1994, he was housed in the
psychiatric unit at the Oklahoma State Penitentiary and treated with various antip-
sychotic medications. Prison doctors continued to prescribe this medication for his
schizophrenia after he was moved back to death row in late 2000. Van Wouden-
berg was offered the medication on a daily basis and sometimes refused his
dosage. However, the State did not use physical force to compel him to ingest it.
According to a psychiatrist and two psychologists retained by the defense, Van
Woudenberg continued to be psychotic after his return to death row. This gave us
reason to believe Van Woudenberg could not actually understand the possible legal
consequences of taking the medication offered by the prison. In this sense, his
ingestion of the drugs was neither voluntary nor based on informed consent.
296. Telephone Interview with Jeffrey Rosenzweig, counsel for Charles Laverne Singleton (Apr. II,
2002).
1 297. Patricia Fleming, Ph.D., Evaluation of Samuel Van Woudenberg at 6, In Re Van Woudenberg,
No. C-94-585 (Okla. Dist. Ct. Feb. 17, 1994).
298. See generally Court Exhibits 1-8, Transcript of Hearing, in Re Van Woudenberg, No. C-94-585
(Okla. Dist. Ct. July 12, 2001).
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During a pretrial hearing in the sanity-determination proceeding, we filed a
motion requesting that the district court suspend the administration of antipsychotic
medications throughout the remainder of the sanity proceedings. In support of this
motion, we cited the due process holdings of Riggins v. Nevada and Washington
v. Harper; the Eighth Amendment principles of Ford v. Wainwright; and the state
constitutional ruling in State v. Perry.'
The motion assumed that the treatment of schizophrenia with antipsychotic drugs
is medically appropriate in general, but that the administration of drugs in this case
interfered with Van Woudenberg's due process right, recognized in Riggins, to
participate in the proceedings and voluntarily appear before the factfinder in an
unmedicated state.' We argued that the prison's medication of Van Woudenberg
was involuntary under Harper and Riggins because Van Woudenberg did not
personally want the medications and because he was unable to comprehend the
legal ramifications of ingesting them."' We also voiced the concern that prison
staff might use subtler forms of psychological pressure to overcome Van
Woudenberg's resistance and convince him to take the medication against his
wishes.' n Finally, we argued that the State could not demonstrate that its use of
medication was necessary to protect any legitimate institutional interest in safety
that could not be accomplished by less intrusive means, such as solitary
confinement, if Van Woudenberg became uncontrollably aggressive.' We argued
that, under these circumstances, the involuntary administration of antipsychotic
drugs violated Van Woudenberg's state and federal constitutional rights to due
process and the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments.'
The district court denied the motion, and we appealed to the Oklahoma Court
of Criminal Appeals by a petition for extraordinary relief.'° The court of
criminal appeals denied relief, finding that the State's use of prescribed antip-
sychotic medication complied with. the relevant statute' and did not violate due
process.' The court relied primarily on documents filed by the State that
299. Motion to Suspend Administration of Anti-Psychotic Medications, In Re Van Woudenberg, No.
C-94-585 (Okla. Dist. Ct. May 18, 2001).
300. Id. at 2.
301. Id. at 5.
302. Id.
303. Id.; see also Transcript of Hearing on Motion at 18-39, In Re Van Woudenberg (No. C-94-585).
304. Motion to Suspend Administration of Anti-Psychotic Medications at 5, In Re Van Woudenberg,
No. C-94-585.
305. Application for Extraordinary Writ of Prohibition and/or Mandamus, Van Woudenberg v. Dist.
Court, No. PR-2001-653 (Okla. Crim. App. May 25, 2001).
306. The statute in question, title 43A, section 5-204(B) of the Oklahoma Statutes, provides:
Treatment and medication may be administered to a nonconsenting individual upon the
written order of a physician who has personally examined the patient and who finds such
medication or treatment is necessary to protect the patient, the facility or others from
serious bodily harm, and who so notes in the individual's medication record, with an
explanation of the facts leading up to the decision to administer treatment and medication
including psychotropic medication.
43A OKLA. STAT. § 5-204(B) (Supp. 2000).
307. Van Woudenberg v. Dist. Court, No. PR-2001-653, at 12 (Okla. Crim. App. July 9, 2000)
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indicated that "[p]etitioner has been diagnosed with [a] chronic psychiatric
condition and that psychotropic medications have been prescribed for Petitioner to
control signs and symptoms of that condition."' ' The State also provided a letter
from its consulting neuropsychologist indicating "an ongoing concern of harm
toward self or others displayed by the actions of Mr. Van Woudenberg.""' The
court concluded that "the medical staff at the State Penitentiary have determined
that treatment is in Petitioner's best interest and that he is being treated accor-
dingly.
3 10
The court rejected our arguments, which were based on Riggins v. Nevada and
Washington v. Harper, that the involuntary medication of Van Woudenberg at a
time when his sanity was about to be judicially determined violated due
process."' The court specifically held that "[p]etitioner's reliance on Riggins is
misplaced as it addresses concerns raised when the defendant is tried before a jury.
. . . The issue in the present case is strictly a post-trial issue." M The court found
Harper "more instructive in the present case."13 Avoiding any discussion of
whether Harper's "medical interest" analysis should apply differently in the case
of a condemned prisoner, the court went on to find that the trial court's holding
"that the decision whether to medicate Petitioner was best left to the medical
professionals at the State Penitentiary was properly based in the law.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals' ruling on the forced medication issue
in Van Woudenberg unfortunately applied a generic test of "medical interest,"
which creates the very paradox that concerned the Louisiana Supreme Court in
State v. Perry and the South Carolina Supreme Court in Singleton v. State. If the
State is actively pursuing the execution of a prisoner already found insane and
involuntary medication is probably the only means of making the prisoner
competent, how can the State credibly claim that its employees are medicating the
inmate for his own good? Only the narrowest conception of the prisoner's medical
interest would justify the State's use of medication in such a case: the treatment
that allegedly helps him today will lead to his execution in the near future. Rather
than acknowledging how elusive the concept of "medical interest" can be in such
cases, the court simply adopted a narrow conception of "medical interest" and
vested the prison's medical staff with an unreviewable discretion to administer
drugs that might seal the prisoner's fate.
Although Van Woudenberg was only refusing his medications intermittently and
was compliant at other times, the court's opinion did not dwell on this problematic
fact in our claim that the medication was "involuntary" under Washington v.
Harper. This was probably due to the emerging recognition that neither Riggins
(order denying petition for writ of prohibition and/or mandamus).
308. Id. at 13.
309. Id. at 14.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 15.
312. Id.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 17.
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nor Harper can be limited to situations where medication of the prisoner is
accomplished through the application of physical force. The HarperlRiggins
concept of "involuntary" medication reaches a variety of situations where the
medication is taken without sufficient understanding of its legal ramifications. In
this sense, the involuntary concept is a variant of the legal construct of "informed
consent." The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals may have noticed a footnote
in Van Woudenberg's petition for extraordinary relief. The footnote cited the
statement of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals in an unpublished decision,
Quintero v. Encarnacion."' In Quintero, a civil rights suit partly based on
Harper and Riggins, the Tenth Circuit stated:
Even if [the patient] did not object explicitly to taking the psychotropic
medications, it does not necessarily follow that she took them volun-
tarily. If she did not know anything about them, or if the effects of the
medications were to blunt' her ability to refuse them, her acquiescence
cannot be characterized as the voluntary ingestion of psychotropic
medications." 6
This section of the article initially posed the question, "When is voluntary not
voluntary"? Van Woudenberg suggests that when a prisoner has been previously
adjudicated insane, his ingestion of medication offered by prison officials may be
involuntary even though the treatment is accomplished without the use of physical
force. Without saying so, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals may have
realized that a prisoner's peaceful compliance with a regimen of medication is not
the equivalent of voluntariness or informed consent.
But Van Woudenberg also suggests that the involuntary character of the
medication does not end the inquiry. The court basically adopted the misguided
approach of the Arkansas Supreme Court in Singleton v. Norris and refused to look
deeper into the forced medication paradox as it relates to condemned prisoners.
After Van Woudenberg, it seems likely that when a challenge to forced medication
arises, the State will immediately invoke its "duty" to medicate the mentally ill
condemned prisoner. And the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals will obligingly
find that the discharge of that duty satisfies the due process rule of Washington v.
Harper. Like the Arkansas Supreme Court in Singleton v. Norris, the Oklahoma
Court of Criminal Appeals may choose to ignore the fact that the State's discharge
of that "duty" will conveniently facilitate its less charitable goal of executing the
prisoner.
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals should have prohibited the State's use
of involuntary medication on insane prisoners until the State permanently removed
the corresponding threat of eventual execution by commutation of the capital
sentence. With such a pro-death penalty court, this was too much to hope for.
Absent such a constitutional ruling, the subject of forcibly medicating the insane
315. 242 F.3d 390, No. 99-3258, 2000 WL 1761030 (10th Cir. Nov. 29, 2000) (unpublished table
decision).
316. Id., 2000 WL 1761030, at *3.
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capital prisoner to facilitate his execution should be addressed with a statute
providing for either judicial modification or executive commutation of death
sentences prior to the use of forced medication to treat a death row inmate's mental
illness. Removal of the capital sentence is the only solution that is consistent with
civilized standards. As it stands now, in the cases of insane capital prisoners, the
path to Oklahoma's execution chamber is paved with the State's good intentions.
IX. Taming the Beasts of Burden: Who Should Prove Insanity and When?
Neither the Oklahoma Statutes nor the U.S. Supreme Court's opinion in Ford
gives a clear statement of which party bears the burden of proof in proceedings to
determine sanity to be executed. The plurality opinion in Ford passed over this
important issue with the observation that "[iut may be that some high threshold
showing on behalf of the prisoner will be found a necessary means to control the
number of nonmeritorious or repetitive claims of insanity.""3 7 To illustrate its
point, the Supreme Court cited Pate v. Robinson, which held that a hearing on
competency to stand trial is required only when the defendant has raised a
"sufficient doubt" that his competency is in question.""
Once a prisoner has made the initial showing of "doubt" and the trial court has
made the decision that a sanity hearing will be held, which party bears the burden
of proof on the ultimate question of present sanity, and by what standard of proof
shall the court decide who prevails? Once a prisoner has been adjudicated insane
and the State alleges that sanity has been restored, who has the burden of proof to
show a restoration of sanity?
Despite the lack of specific statutory or constitutional direction, the answers to
these questions are fairly straightforward. Through a combination of general legal
principles, constitutional decisions on competency in other contexts, and the few
decisions that have addressed the issue, the trial and appellate courts can allocate
the burden of proof and adopt a standard of proof that will likely comply with
constitutional guarantees. This section will discuss these lines of authority and
provide a procedural framework for the fair adjudication of claims of insanity to
be executed.
A. Constitutional Considerations
Old cases frequently say that "sanity being the normal and usual condition of
mankind, the law presumes that every person is sane."3"9 The Supreme Court has
recognized that a similar presumption applies to questions of mental competency
to stand trial. In Medina v. California,"' the Court held that a California statute
requiring a defendant to prove his incompetence to stand trial by a preponderance
317. Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 417 (1986) (citing Pate v. Robinson, 383 U.S. 375, 387
(1966) (holding that a hearing on competency to stand trial is required if "sufficient doubt" of
competency exists)).
318. Id.
319. Adams v. State, 1930 OK CR ., - 292 P. 385, 385.
320. 505 U.S. 437 (1992).
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of the evidence did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of due
process of law. 2 Medina effectively permits state courts to presume a defendant
is competent until he demonstrates incompetency by the greater weight of the
evidence.
While competency to stand trial and competency to be executed are very
different factual inquiries, the State's decision to place the burden of proof on a
capital prisoner to prove his insanity by a preponderance of the evidence would
likely be constitutional after Medina. The Supreme Court would likely regard such
a measure as "a necessary means to control the number of nonmeritorious or
repetitive claims of insanity" that concerned the Court in Ford.3" This seems
particularly true when one considers that the capital prisoner is regarded as duly
convicted and lawfully sentenced to death. The state of insanity is simply a bar to
execution of an otherwise valid judgment. Justice Powell probably echoed the
sentiments of a great many jurists in his concurring opinion in Ford when he said
the following about claims of insanity to be executed:
First, the Eighth Amendment claim at issue can arise only after the
prisoner has been validly convicted of a capital crime and sentenced
to death. Thus, in this case the State has a substantial and legitimate
interest in taking petitioner's life as punishment for his crime. That
interest is not called into question by petitioner's claim. Rather, the
only question raised is not whether, but when, his execution may take
place."
Although the State's interest in executing the validly convicted capital prisoner
commands substantial weight in the matter of allocating the burden of proof in
sanity hearings, the U.S. Constitution does restrict the State's ability to impose an
unusually high standard of proof on the capital prisoner in such proceedings. In
Cooper v. Oklahoma," the U.S. Supreme Court held that an Oklahoma statute
requiring an allegedly incompetent criminal defendant to prove his incompetence
to stand trial by "clear and convincing evidence" violated the Fourteenth
Amendment's guarantee of due process of law." Because proceedings to
determine competence to stand trial are the closest analogue of a proceeding to
determine sanity to be executed, the due process analysis in Cooper is highly
relevant.
In Cooper, the Supreme Court concluded that the "clear and convincing" burden
of proof created fundamental unfairness in cases where the defendant's interests
were significant and the harm to the State, from an erroneous determination of the
issue, was minimal."
321. Id. at 448.
322. Ford, 477 U.S. at 417.
323. Id. at 425 (Powell, J., concurring).
324. 517 U.S. 348 (1996).
325. Id. at 369.
326. Id. at 364-65.
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Contemporary and historical procedures are fully consistent with our
evaluation of the risks inherent in Oklahoma's practice of requiring the
defendant to prove incompetence by clear and convincing evidence.
The "more stringent the burden of proof a party must bear, the more
that party bears the risk of an erroneous decision." For that reason, we
have held that due process places a heightened burden of proof on the
State in civil proceedings in which the "individual interests at stake...
are both 'particularly important' and 'more substantial than mere loss
of money."'
Far from "jealously guard[ing]," an incompetent criminal defendant's
fundamental right not to stand trial, Oklahoma's practice of requiring
the defendant to prove incompetence by clear and convincing evidence
imposes a significant risk of an erroneous determination that the
defendant is competent.""
Under the analysis of Cooper, a statute requiring the capital prisoner to prove
insanity by clear and convincing evidence would almost certainly violate the
Fourteenth Amendment and would be inadequate to protect the Eighth Amendment
rights recognized in Ford. Although Cooper involved competence to stand trial,
the observations of the Supreme Court hold equally true in a sanity determination.
The observation made by the Supreme Court in Cooper applies to all cases:
"The 'more stringent the burden of proof a party must bear, the more that party
bears the risk of an erroneous decision."'"" Even more so than the prisoner who
is incompetent to stand trial, "the consequences of an erroneous determination of
competence [to be executed] are dire," and, in such cases, almost immediate.'
An erroneous finding of sanity exposes the prisoner to the prospect of imminent
execution. Like the burden of proof condemned in Cooper, a rule requiring a
prisoner to demonstrate his insanity under such a rigorous standard of proof has
an almost inevitable consequence: the clear and convincing standard of proof will
lead to executions of prisoners who can prove that they are, more likely than not,
insane. Considering the ancient common law prohibition against executing the
insane, the clear and convincing standard of proof would threaten a 'fundamental
component of our criminal justice system' and would offend a "principle of justice
so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our people as to be ranked as
fundamental.'"""
327. Id. at 362-63 (citations omitted) (quoting Cruzan v. Mo. Dep't of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 283
(1990); Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 756 (1982); Jacob v. New York City, 315 U.S. 752, 752-53
(1942)).
328. Id. at 362 (quoting Cruzan, 497 U.S. at 283).
329. Id. at 364.
330. Id. at 362, 367 (quoting United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 653 (1984); Patterson v. New
York, 432 U.S. 197 (1977)).
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B. Burden and Standard of Proof in Other Jurisdictions
The few modern cases that have addressed the allocation of the burden of proof
and the proper standard of proof in determining sanity to be executed appear to
incorporate the constitutional principles outlined above. In each of these cases, the
state courts have recognized the general presumption of sanity and held that the
prisoner has the initial burden of proof to show insanity by a preponderance in
order to stay the execution. However, a prisoner adjudicated insane is entitled to
the presumption that his insanity continues. Therefore, the State must prove that
sanity has been restored by a preponderance of the evidence.
In Van Tran v. State,3 ' the Tennessee Supreme Court faced a petition alleging
that a capital prisoner was presently insane and should not be executed. Because
the state legislature had failed to enact any procedure for determining sanity to be
executed, the court exercised its supervisory authority and promulgated procedures
to be followed in compliance with Ford v. Wainwright."2 Consistent with many
states, Tennessee adopted an initial presumption of competency that the prisoner
must overcome by the greater weight of the evidence.333 The Tennessee Supreme
Court also addressed the question of which party should bear the burden of proof
after a prior adjudication of insanity. The court held that in cases where the
prisoner was previously found incompetent, the State would subsequently bear an
equivalent burden to demonstrate a restoration to sanity."
In declaring this allocation of the burden of proof, the Tennessee Supreme Court
followed the holding of the South Carolina Supreme Court in Singleton v.
State,33 which stated the rule as follows:
Once the defendant is found incompetent and the stay of execution is
affirmed by this Court, the burden necessarily shifts to the State to
move for a hearing upon the defendant's return to competency. At this
subsequent hearing, the State must show by a preponderance of the
evidence that the defendant is competent to be executed. If the State
331. 6 S.W.3d 257 (Tenn. 1999).
332. Id. at 260-61.
333. Id. at 268. The court stated, "At the outset we note that at the hearing the prisoner is presumed
to be competent to be executed .. . .To prevail, the prisoner must overcome the presumption of
competency by a preponderance of the evidence." Id. at 270-71 (citation omitted) (citing Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 426 (1986) (Powell, J., concurring)).
334. Id. at 272-73. In so holding, the court reasoned:
Until and unless a statutory review procedure is adopted, the order staying execution will
direct the parties to file in this Court every six months a status report which summarizes
the prisoner's mental condition. When and if these submissions indicate that the prisoner
has regained competency, this Court will remand the case to the trial court for a hearing
to determine whether the prisoner has regained competency so that an execution date may
be scheduled. At the hearing, the State will bear the burden of proving competency by
a preponderance of the evidence.
Id. (citations omitted).
335. 437 S.E.2d 53 (S.C. 1993).
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establishes competency, then the... court may lift the previous stay
of execution subject to the review of this Court."
The same rule is found in State v. Perry,3 7 a case already discussed in the
section of this article that addresses the forced-medication issue. After the prisoner
was adjudicated insane to be executed by the state trial court, the Louisiana
Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's ruling in this respect, stating that "in order
to modify this stay order the State must demonstrate to this Court that Perry has
achieved or regained his sanity and competence for execution." '338
Trial courts conducting proceedings to determine sanity to be executed in
Oklahoma can follow these rulings with substantial confidence. The constitutional
cases certainly permit the State to require that the prisoner alleging insanity in bar
of execution should prove his insanity by the greater weight of the evidence. The
cases recognize a legitimate interest in the State's execution of the judgment, which
might be frustrated by spurious and repetitive claims of insanity. However, the
adoption of any higher standard of proof, such as "clear and convincing" evidence,
inappropriately allocates too much risk of factfinding error to the prisoner. It also
probably violates state and federal constitutional due process guarantees and the
full and fair hearing guaranteed insanity cases under Ford v. Wainwright.
In cases where the prisoner has already been adjudicated insane, the trial court
must shift the presumption in the prisoner's favor and require the State to
demonstrate that sanity has been restored. Oklahoma's courts have recognized in
several contexts that a prior judicial finding of insanity gives rise to a presumption
of continued insanity, and shifts the burden of proof to the party alleging that the
person in question has regained sanity. In Keenan v. Scott,39 an action to set
aside certain deeds based on the grantor's mental incapacity, the Oklahoma
Supreme Court held:
In all civil actions it is generally held that the burden of proof of
insanity rests upon him who alleges insanity, or seeks to avoid an act
on account of it, and it devolves upon him to establish the fact of
insanity by a preponderance of the evidence. If, however, a previous
state of insanity is proved, the burden of proof is then usually con-
sidered to shift to him who asserts that the act was done while the
person was sane ...
The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals followed the same rule in Adams v.
State," a homicide prosecution in which the defense was insanity at the time of
the offense. There, the court found the presumption was proper in cases where the
proof showed mental disease of a chronic nature.4 2
336. Id. at 60.
337. 610 So. 2d 746 (La. 1992).
338. Id. at 771.
339. 1924 OK 470, 225 P. 906.
340. Id. I. _, 225 P. at 906.
341. 1930 OK CR __, 292 P. 385.
342. Id. I _, 292 P. at 388. Quoting from Corpuw Juris, the court stated, "'General insanity
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In the Van Woudenberg case, the district court effectively applied this
presumption and required the State to bear the burden of proving the allegation of
restored sanity by a preponderance of the evidence. Van Woudenberg had proven
his insanity to the satisfaction of a jury in 1994, under the more rigorous clear and
convincing evidence standard used by the trial court at that time. In the 2001
proceedings, the district court avoided this "clear and convincing" standard
altogether, and its ruling was unchallenged by the parties.
The presumption of insanity that arises from a prior adjudication of insanity is
a fundamentally fair allocation of the risk of error in litigation of a fact question
that is easily alleged but usually difficult to establish in court. The party alleging.
insanity may be justly required to adduce persuasive evidence of the claim. But
having brought forward the evidence to establish the condition in a previous
judicial proceeding, he is entitled to the benefit of doubt when the State seeks to
overturn that finding and proceed with an execution.
X. Conclusion
This article attempts to provide a comprehensive discussion of common law,
statutory, and constitutional rules in the uncommon law of sanity to be executed. The
rules and procedures discussed here are important because they helped to save the
life of a truly insane prisoner and thus prevented a grave miscarriage of justice.
When properly understood by advocates and conscientiously followed by judges,
these same rules should continue to prevent the cruelty and injustice of such
executions in the future.
Through the Indigent Defense Act, Sammy Van Woudenberg was provided counsel
to represent him and funds to retain three experts to conduct separate mental-health
evaluations. Due to the complexity of mental illness and the natural skepticism
toward claims of insanity (or the possibility of "sanism" as described by Michael
Perlin), 3 the process of selecting experts and developing forensic evidence became
a major focus of our efforts. By retaining three independent experts, we borrowed
from an old statutory concept in mental-health law and created a quasi-"sanity
commission" of independent examiners who would conduct their evaluations and
reach their conclusions independent of one another.
The experts chosen also reflected specific needs in the development of our case.
In order to compare and contrast Van Woudenberg's present mental status with his
condition in 1994, when the jury originally declared him insane, Van Woudenberg
was re-evaluated by Dr. John R. Smith, a psychiatrist who testified for Van
Woudenberg at the 1994 trial. Because the probative value of his testimony might
be limited by his perceived professional bias and identification with the defense in
a prior proceeding, we also retained a forensic psychologist from another state with
no prior connection to the case. Because the State's case largely depended on
admitted or once proved to exist, is presumed to continue, and if a recovery or lucid interval is alleged
to have occurred, the burden to prove such allegation is on the person making it."' Id. at 388 (quoting
32 C.J. Insane Persons § 561, at 757).
343. See supra note 208.
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testimony from correctional officials and prison medical personnel who believed that
Van Woudenberg had been malingering his symptoms of psychosis, we chose Dr.
Richard Rogers as our second forensic examiner. Dr. Rogers is a nationally
recognized expert in the detection of malingering and the author of the Structured
Interview of Reported Symptoms (SIRS), a widely validated standardized test for
malingering of psychological symptoms. Our recent entry into the rapidly unfolding
case and our lack of familiarity with Van Woudenberg's mental condition necessitated
a third expert who was readily available and could give us competent, up-to-date
forensic assessments of Van Woudenberg's condition on short notice. So we engaged
a third forensic psychologist, Dr. Kathryn LaFortune (who is employed as a capital
defense lawyer for another division of the Indigent Defense System), who provided
us with periodic forensic assessments of Van Woudenberg's condition at any time
without the prohibitive expense of repeated interviews by our other evaluators.
All three of the forensic examiners independently concluded that Sammy Van
Woudenberg was insane. Their written reports were eventually admitted as evidence
in the case and formed the basis for the district court's findings of fact. Had we not
proceeded to develop our evidence in this way, we might have failed to convince a
skeptical factfinder at trial or to raise a genuine concern among reviewing judges on
appeal, regardless of the fact that Sammy Van Woudenberg was insane. The strength
of the evidence produced in those three separate evaluations and the corroboration
of those findings by two experts engaged by the State, Drs. Herman Jones and
Randall Price, contributed to the resolution of the issue without a contested trial.
The district court, in a pretrial ruling, properly allocated the burden of proof to the
State. When the forensic experts for both sides had completed their evaluations, it
became clear that the State could not present persuasive evidence to support its
earlier allegation that Van Woudenberg had regained his sanity. On July 10, 2001,
the parties entered a stipulation that the available evidence demonstrated Van
Woudenberg's insanity and that his execution would violate the state and federal
constitutions. Even the warden, who had signed the letter to Governor Keating
alleging that the prisoner had regained his reason, formally withdrew the allegation.
The district court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law to this effect. On
this uncontested record, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals affirmed the
district court on August 20, 2001. In its order, the Oklahoma Court of Criminal
Appeals found Van Woudenberg presently insane and remanded him to the warden's
custody for "proper placement and treatment."'
The order made no mention of the lingering paradox of "treating" Van Wouden-
berg with antipsychotic medications to facilitate his eventual execution. Despite its
silence, the problem of medicating to execute is the most disturbing legal conundrum
to emerge from the case. It is a question that will haunt courts in future cases,
especially if the State's effort to medicate an insane prisoner is pursued by more
aggressive methods than those used on Sammy Van Woudenberg. Before that sad
day comes, it is my hope that responsible legislative, judicial, and executive officers
344. Van Woudenberg v. State, No. D-84-95 (Okla. Crim. App. Aug. 20, 2001) (order denying
request for execution date).
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will acknowledge and condemn by law the immoral practice of drugging insane
prisoners and then executing them when they "recover their reason."
The kinds of severe mental or neurological disease that bring on the legal state of
insanity are typically chronic and profoundly disabling. A death row inmate who has
been found insane by a court or jury is unlikely to ever recover "reason" in the sense
that civilized humans understand that term. Condemned by the false witness born of
his own shattered senses, he is chained within the dilapidated prison of his mind. In
many ways, he has departed this world already. Across the chasm of centuries, the
ancients tell us the madman is to be punished by his madness alone. The palliatives
of modem psychiatry have not overthrown that piercing maxim, and unless the
treatment of the insane capital prisoner is coupled with a grant of clemency, the law
has merely harnessed the power of science to subvert an eternal moral truth.
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